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1 IN TRO D U CTIO N  
A  PRO -PO O R G RO W TH  A PPRO A CH  TO  FIN A N CIA L PO LICY  
This module describes the current state of know ledge w ith respect to  
pro-poor grow th financial policies.1 These policies are presented as 
alternatives to w hat, w e argue, are the failed financial policies inspired  
by orthodox economics. O rthodox financial policies, also know n as 
‘W ashington Consensus’ policies, have been implemented in a large  
number of developing countries over the last quarter century. W e explore  
the logic of these financial policies and examine the diverse w ays in w hich 
they have failed the developing w orld.  
The principal goals of this module are to present a range of financial 
policies that have been utilized in some countries to promote pro-poor 
grow th at various times, and also to present a set of more innovative  
policies that have not yet been utilized, but w hich w e argue can also  
support pro-poor grow th. W e maintain, in fact, that there exists a w ealth  
of such experiences and strategies available to practitioners in the 
developing w orld.  
 
“Dom estic financial 
liberalization has 
unam biguously failed 
 to deliver m ost of the 
rew ards claim ed by  
its proponents”. 
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1.1  A BRIEF REVIEW  O F H ISTO RICAL EXPERIEN CE 
If the 1950s and 1960s w ere the ‘golden age’ of capitalism in the industrialized w orld, then in much 
of the developing w orld, this period should be remembered as the age of the ‘developmental state’ 
[Marglin and Schor, 1990; W ade, 1990; Amsden, 2001]. In many parts of the developing w orld, 
especially those that had recently w on independence from colonial pow ers, the state w as seen as a 
general agent of economic development. Its prescribed tasks included mobilizing and directing 
savings for industrialization; using industrial and trade policy (including tariffs) to guide investment 
and industrial development; implementing financial market regulations (including capital and 
exchange controls) to marshal domestic and international financial resources for domestic 
investment and to manage the country's relations w ith the international markets; and using 
government ow nership of given financial and industrial firms to control the rate and direction of 
investment, to generate employment and to address various social problems, such as poverty [e.g., 
N embhard, 1996; W oo-Cumings, 1999]. Many developing countries, such as India, Brazil, Argentina, 
Taiw an PO C, Republic of Korea, Singapore, South Africa and Ghana, used such diverse types of 
policies to industrialize and to promote economic grow th and improvements in living standards.  
In the area of finance, many developing country states w ere especially active. These countries 
w ere taking a leaf from Alexander Gerschenkron's famous thesis that ‘late developers’ had to make 
use of special financial institutions to mobilize and channel savings for long-term investment and 
grow th because of the scale and complexity involved in catching up to global leaders 
[Gerschenkron, 1962]. Moreover, significant involvement by the state in the area of finance w as in 
keeping w ith the general tenor of the times, w hich had perceived the calamitous role of private 
finance in the disastrous collapse of the w orld economy in the 1930s [H elleiner, 1994; Kindleberger, 
1973]. D uring this period, a variety of state-ow ned, state-regulated or state-directed financial 
institutions w ere created to mobilize and channel credit to agricultural and industrial sectors of the 
economy, as w ell as to important social sectors such as housing and education.  
Significantly, these policies of state management and direction of finance w ere used w idely 
not only in many developing countries, but also in the developed w orld [Zysman, 1983]. In 
countries w ith economic systems as diverse as those in Japan, France, the U nited States and 
Germany, financial regulations and state-ow ned or state-directed banks w ere used for a range of 
economic and social purposes, including subsidizing housing, supporting industrial policy and 
export promotion, promoting small businesses and financing infrastructure development  
[Pollin, 1995; Grabel, 1997; Epstein, 2006]. 
In the era of the developmental state, central banks in developing countries often cooperated 
w ith or w ere under the control of governments. These ‘developmental central banks’ supported 
the state's developmental goals through a variety of tools and mechanisms, including subsidizing 
credit and regulating financial institutions to direct credit to specific purposes [Bloomfield, 1957; 
Brimmer, 1971]. In fact, as a marker of the times, many of these developmental central banks w ere 
established w ith the help and advice of the N ew  York Federal Reserve, w hich today w ould arguably 
have no part of such advice [H elleiner, 2003]. This type of central bank practice, of course, contrasts 
radically w ith today’s orthodox vision of central banks, institutions that are exhorted to be 
politically independent of governments and to focus primarily, if not exclusively, on keeping 
inflation in the low  single digits.  
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As prominent Federal Reserve economist and historian Arthur Bloomfield noted: 
“Many of the central banks, especially those established since 1945 w ith the help of Federal Reserve advisers 
(emphasis added) are characterized by unusually w ide and flexible pow ers. A large number of instruments of 
general and selective credit control, some of a novel character, are provided for. Pow ers are given to the 
central bank to engage in a w ide range of credit operations w ith commercial banks and in some cases w ith 
other financial institutions…   These and other pow ers w ere specifically provided in the hope of enabling the 
central banks…   to pursue a more purposive (emphasis added) and effective monetary policy than had been 
possible for most…   that had been set up…   during the tw enties and thirties…   w hich permitted little scope 
for a monetary policy designed to prom ote econom ic developm ent and internal stability (emphasis added)… ” 
[Bloomfield, 1957, p. 191]. 
 
It w as a sign of the times, then, that even the U .S. Federal Reserve System w as helping 
developing countries create developmental central banks.  
As w e discuss in the next section, the post-w ar vision of developmental central banking and 
financial policies in the service of pro-poor grow th fell out of fashion as part of the general 
reassertion of orthodox economic theory and policy in the mid-to-late 1970s. In the financial arena, 
the reassertion of orthodox economics w as embodied in the adoption of policies of internal and 
external financial liberalization, the creation of independent central banks and the use of inflation 
targeting [on the latter, see Saad Filho, 2006; Epstein, 2002, 2005].  
W e w ill see that these orthodox policies have been associated w ith reductions in inflation 
relative to its high levels in the 1980s. But these same policies have also been associated w ith 
serious pathologies: recurrent financial crises (e.g., in Turkey in 1992, Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 
1997 and Argentina in 2001); major increases in domestic and, by some measures, in global 
inequality [Milanovic, 2005]; slow er economic grow th and even stagnation in some parts of the 
w orld, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa; and increases in unemployment or underemployment  
in many parts of the developing w orld. In view  of these failures, the time is ripe to consider new  
approaches to domestic, central bank and external financial policies.  
1.2  PRIN CIPLES O F FIN AN CIAL PO LICIES FO R PRO -PO O R GRO W TH  
Before w e consider policy alternatives, w e have to answ er the follow ing question: W hat do w e 
mean by pro-poor grow th financial policies? At one level, this is quite easy to answ er. W e w ill 
describe policies and institutions that are designed to mobilize and channel savings, allocate credit 
in accordance w ith identified social and economic objectives, and promote financial and 
macroeconomic stability w ith the goal of promoting grow th that w ill generate employment, 
income and w ealth for the poor.  
To achieve these outcomes, financial policies have to serve general purposes, as w ell as 
specific purposes related to the needs of particular countries and regions. More precisely, the 
financial sector can play an important and productive role in promoting pro-poor grow th through 
the follow ing channels:  
• Mobilize savings for productive investment and employment generation; 
• Create credit for employment generation and poverty reduction at modest and stable 
real interest rates; 
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• Allocate credit for employment generation and help the poor to build assets, including 
in agriculture, in small- and medium-sized enterprises and in housing; 
• Provide patient (long-term) credit for productivity-enhancing innovation and 
investment; 
• Provide financing for public investment to provide for employment generation and 
productivity enhancement;  
• H elp to allocate risks to those w ho can most easily and efficiently bear such risks; 
• H elp to stabilize the economy by reducing vulnerability to financial crises and pro-
cyclical movements in finance, and by helping to maintain moderate rates of inflation; 
• H elp the poor by providing basic financial and banking services. 
 
1.3  GO ALS AN D  O RGAN IZATIO N  O F TH E MO D ULE 
The chief goal of this Training Module is to describe how  the diverse parts of the financial sector 
(namely, the domestic and external sectors and the central bank) can play the roles described 
above. In section 2 of this module w e describe the logic and the (failed) performance of the 
financial policies inspired by orthodox economic theory. In section 3 w e present a snapshot of the 
problematic state of the financial environment in developing countries today. Sections 4-6 are the 
heart of this module insofar as they present a range of financial policies that can be used to 
promote pro-poor grow th. Section 4 presents policies for the domestic financial sector, section 5 
policies for developmental central banks, and section 6 policies tow ard external financial flow s.  
2  O RTH O D O X  A PPRO A CH ES TO  FIN A N CIA L PO LICY  
IN  D EVELO PIN G  CO U N TRIES 
H aving made a case for pro-poor financial policy above, w e now  consider an alternative logic that 
w e term the orthodox view . The orthodox view  has driven the financial policy decisions made in 
most (but not all) developing and w ealthy countries over the last quarter century. There are many 
reasons for the shift tow ard orthodox financial policies. These include advocacy on the part of the 
U .S. and U .K. governments and of the Bretton W oods and other multilateral institutions; 
w idespread acceptance of orthodox economic theory; increased pow er and autonomy of the 
financial sector both globally and nationally; and the attempt by policymakers in developing 
countries to use open financial markets as magnets for international capital flow s. 
In this section, w e explain the theoretical basis of the orthodox case for liberalization  
(i.e., deregulation) of the domestic financial sector and of international capital flow s. Although in 
practice they are often treated together, w e discuss these tw o dimensions of liberalization 
separately in sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively, for the sake of clarity. N ote that the reduction of 
poverty is not central to the orthodox case for financial liberalization. N evertheless, liberalization  
is seen to benefit the poor through numerous channels. In section 2.3 w e w ill briefly review  the 
performance of the financial reforms inspired by the orthodox view . W e w ill see that this policy  
has failed to achieve its chief goals and that it has aggravated critical problems (such as poverty, 
inequality and instability). These failures stand in sharp contrast to the limited successes that can 
be attributed to financial liberalization, as w e w ill also see. 
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2.1  TH E O RTH O D O X CASE FO R LIBERALIZATIO N  O F TH E D O MESTIC FIN AN CIAL SECTO R2 
O rthodox economists maintain that w hen state regulation of domestic finance w as the norm—
from the end of W W II until the mid-to-late 1970s—it w as counterproductive. Today, such policies 
continue to be seen as counterproductive in the few  developing countries that remain committed 
to active state involvement in finance. O rthodox economists use the ideologically-charged term 
‘financial repression’ to describe financial systems that are actively regulated in accordance w ith 
state development goals. Such systems tend to be dominated by banks w hose decisions are 
influenced by governments, rather than by capital (i.e., stock and bond) markets. 
In the orthodox view , active state involvement in the financial sector has a number of adverse 
consequences. The maintenance of low  interest rates (particularly in the context of high inflation) 
encourages domestic savers to hold funds abroad and makes current consumption more attractive 
than saving in domestic financial institutions. H igh levels of consumer spending can put upw ard 
pressure on prices and thereby aggravate inflationary pressures. Low  savings rates also mean that 
domestic banks have an insufficient pool of savings from w hich to extend loans. The level of domestic 
investment is thus compromised by active financial regulation, and employment and economic grow th 
suffer accordingly. It is through employment, grow th and price channels that orthodox economists 
maintain that state involvement in finance negatively affects living standards and poverty.  
Furthermore, orthodox economists contend that active state involvement in finance 
fragments domestic financial markets, w ith only a small segment of politically-connected 
borrow ers gaining access to scarce low -cost credit. D isenfranchised borrow ers must either resort to 
unregulated ‘informal’ (or ‘curb’) lenders, w ho often charge exorbitant interest rates, or otherw ise 
manage in the face of their unmet needs for capital. Entrepreneurship, employment-creation and 
grow th therefore suffer. These negative effects are disproportionately experienced by the poor 
since the burden of scarce credit hits them hardest. They rarely have access to alternative, low er-
cost sources of credit, such as the finance available on international capital markets.  
In view  of the above, orthodox economists argue that developing countries must liberalize 
their domestic financial systems. A liberalized financial system w ith a competitive capital market is 
seen as central to the promotion of high levels of savings, investment, employment, productivity, 
foreign capital inflow s and grow th. From this perspective, liberalized systems serve the interests of 
the poor and the disenfranchised (as w ell as other groups) by increasing access to capital, w ith 
attendant benefits for employment, investment and grow th.  
O rthodox economists also maintain that domestic financial liberalization increases not only 
the level of investment, but also its quality (i.e., its efficiency) by allocating funds across investment 
projects according to rate-of-return criteria and via w hat are seen as objective or ‘arms-length’ 
practices. D omestic financial liberalization is seen to improve the overall efficiency of the financial 
system by eliminating the w asteful and corrupt practices that flourish under financial regulation, as 
w ell as by subjecting borrow ers and firm managers to market discipline. Market discipline and 
reduced corruption improve the operating performance of financial institutions and consequently 
enhance the prospects for financial stability.  
In the orthodox view , liberalization has other benefits. It encourages the creation of new  
financial instruments (e.g., derivatives) and of markets in w hich to trade them. This is termed 
financial innovation. Investment and financial stability are promoted by new  opportunities to 
diversify and disperse risk. By increasing the availability of finance, liberalization also eliminates the 
need for informal finance, w hich often exploits the poor, and allow s borrow ers to utilize the forms 
of finance that are most appropriate to their investment projects.  
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O rthodox economists see the finance provided through capital markets as preferable to bank 
loans because it is understood to have a greater ability to disperse risk, is allocated according to 
objective efficiency and performance criteria, is cheaper than other forms of external finance (such 
as bank loans) and is highly liquid. The liquidity attribute is considered especially desirable because 
it places firm managers under the threat of investor exit (or higher capital costs) if they under-
perform. (See section 2.2 for further discussion.) The promotion of internationally-integrated capital 
markets has the added benefit of facilitating the rapid integration of developing countries into the 
global financial system. 
Some orthodox economists argue that full domestic financial liberalization can be attained 
only once other sectors of the economy (such as tradable goods and labour markets) are w ell 
functioning and liberalized. This is know n as the sequencing view . H ow ever, many orthodox 
economists reject arguments for sequencing because of the problems introduced by this strategy 
(such as the possibility that it gives time for interest groups to mobilize to block liberalization). 
D espite the debate about the speed and sequencing of liberalization among some orthodox 
economists, there is no dispute among them that a liberalized domestic financial sector is the ideal 
to be attained by developing countries.  
2.2  TH E O RTH O D O X CASE FO R LIBERALIZATIO N  O F IN TERNATIO NAL CAPITAL FLO W S 
In the orthodox view , there are numerous benefits associated w ith unfettered international private 
capital flow s. O pen capital markets give the public and private sectors access to capital and other 
resources (such as technology) that are not being generated domestically. Sufficient capital and 
other resources are not generated domestically because of low  income, savings and grow th and 
capital flight. Thus, orthodox economists maintain that an increase in private capital inflow s w ill 
inaugurate a virtuous cycle by increasing a nation’s capital stock, productivity, investment, 
economic grow th and employment. All of these benefits redound to the advantage of society as a 
w hole, and particularly to that of the poor, since higher levels of investment increase overall 
employment opportunities, especially in the modern, technologically advanced firms that are 
financed by foreign investment. Likew ise, the sale of government bonds to foreign investors 
increases the resources available for public expenditure, resources that are often scarce due to tax 
collection problems and the myriad demands on budgets. The poor w ill also benefit if the new  
spending is oriented in their direction.  
O rthodox economists also argue that international private capital flow s increase efficiency  
and policy discipline. The need to attract private capital flow s and the threat of capital flight (by 
domestic and foreign investors) are pow erful incentives for the government and firms to maintain 
international standards for ‘good policy,’ macroeconomic performance and corporate governance. 
Specifically, orthodox economists maintain that governments seeking to attract international 
private capital flow s are more likely to pursue anti-inflationary policies and anti-corruption 
measures because foreign investors value price stability, transparency and the rule of law . The poor 
benefit from stable prices and transparency since they are less able than the rich to hedge against 
inflation or extract benefits from corrupt regimes.  
Liberalization of international capital flow s means that a greater proportion of total financial 
flow s w ill be allocated by capital markets or foreign banks that are not influenced by developing 
country governments. In the orthodox view , this shift in the allocation mechanism increases 
efficiency and ensures that finance is directed tow ards projects that promise the greatest net 
contribution to social w elfare. These are the projects promising the highest rates of return. H ere, 
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too, there is an assumed benefit to the poor as they stand equal to the rich and the politically 
connected in the competition for capital in internationally integrated markets. 
For the reasons advanced above, orthodox economists hold that liberalization of capital flow s 
is essential to promote sound economic performance, particularly w ith regard to investment and 
grow th. Indeed, had the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 not intervened, the IMF w as poised to 
modify Article 6 of its Articles of Agreement to make the liberalization of international private 
capital flow s a central purpose of the Fund and to extend its jurisdiction to capital movements. 
Similarly w ith respect to domestic financial liberalization, some orthodox economists argue 
that the liberalization of international capital flow s (especially the most liquid of these) should be 
undertaken only after successful liberalization of other sectors or the attainment of sufficient 
institutional and regulatory capacity. Advocates of sequencing generally find their case 
strengthened follow ing financial crises because these are held to be a consequence of premature 
external financial liberalization. N otably, follow ing the East Asian crisis, some studies, even by IMF 
staff, acknow ledged that certain techniques for managing international capital flow s can prevent 
undue financial volatility, provided that capital management techniques are temporary and that the 
rest of the economy is liberalized [e.g., Prasad, Rogoff, W ei, Kose, 2003; Kuczynski and W illiamson, 
2003]. N ote that even among advocates of sequencing, there is no question that complete 
liberalization is the ultim ate goal for all developing countries. 
2.3  TH E PERFO RMAN CE O F LIBERALIZED  FIN AN CIAL SYSTEMS  
Financial liberalization has been the norm in developing countries in the last quarter century.  
The policy has enjoyed a few  successes and suffered numerous unambiguous failures.  
O n the positive side of the balance sheet, liberalization has furthered the integration of 
developing countries into global markets. This has meant that certain large firms, especially in the 
context of privatization programs, have received significant finance through the internationally 
integrated capital markets created or expanded follow ing financial liberalization. The finance 
provided to these firms has often been cheaper than that available via bank loans. 
Counterfactually, it is at least plausible to assume that the investment levels of firms that have 
gained access to new  pools of finance have probably been higher than they w ould have been in 
the absence of liberalization. Financial liberalization has meant that governments have been able 
to raise (i.e., borrow ) funds on international capital markets. Middle-class consumers may also have 
benefited from access to international credit markets and from the opportunity to diversify their 
portfolios internationally. Finally, the higher interest rates associated w ith financial liberalization, 
together w ith the adoption of inflation targeting programs, have helped to low er rates of inflation 
in developing countries. 
H ow ever, even these achievements are not w ithout complications. The grow th of large firms 
(and the contraction of small firms that cannot afford to borrow  at high interest rates) has 
increased business concentration. The low er-cost capital that has become available to certain 
large firms after financial liberalization has fuelled speculative bubbles in many countries. 
Moreover, capital markets reinforce rather than undermine existing dualisms characterized by 
greater access to low er-cost external finance by large firms. There is no evidence that the grow th 
of capital markets increases access to finance or low ers its cost for those entrepreneurs w ho have 
long faced severe capital constraints.  
Indeed, as McKinley notes, follow ing financial liberalization, commercial banks have 
concentrated their activities in the major urban areas of developing countries. H e goes on to 
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explain that “although aggregate statistics of financial deepening might have improved follow ing 
financial liberalization, access to credit has become, if anything, more unequal. The rural population 
remains deprived of credit in most countries, and is likely w orse off compared to the access to 
credit that state-ow ned agricultural banks had previously provided” [p. 21]. McKinley [2005:23] 
concludes that, in the African case, the private sector has had even less access to credit after 
financial liberalization than before it.  
Large foreign-ow ned banks come to play a greater role in the domestic financial system 
follow ing the removal of restrictions on their presence. Large foreign-ow ned banks that generally 
enter developing countries after liberalization are not responsive to the needs of small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) [see W eller, 2001b]. Interestingly, a study of large banks in the U .S.A. finds 
that they are less w illing to lend to small firms than are smaller banks [Berger et al., 2001]. This finding 
should give policymakers in developing countries an additional reason to be cautious w hen 
abandoning restrictions on cross-border and domestic bank mergers as part of liberalization 
programs because this can aggravate the serious financing constraints already faced by SMEs.  
There is a large body of empirical evidence demonstrating that domestic financial 
liberalization has unambiguously failed to deliver most of the rew ards claimed by its proponents 
[e.g., Arestis and D emetriades, 1997; W illiamson and Mahar, 1998; Zhu, Ash and Pollin, 2004, 1998; 
Ang and McKibbin, 2005]. D omestic savings have not responded positively to liberalization. 
Financial liberalization has not promoted long-term investment in the types of projects or sectors 
that are central to development and to the amelioration of social ills, such as unemployment, 
poverty and inequality. Financial liberalization has created the climate, opportunity and 
incentives for investment in speculative activities and has directed the focus to short-term 
financial as opposed to long-term developmental returns. Granted, the creation of a speculative 
bubble may temporarily result in an increase in investment and overall economic activity. 
H ow ever, an unsustainable and financially fragile environment, or w hat Grabel [1995] terms 
‘speculation-led development’, is hardly in the long-term interest of developing countries. Such 
an environment certainly does not improve the situation of the poor—indeed it w orsens their 
conditions of life, as w e w ill see.  
O ne channel by w hich the speculation-led development induced by financial liberalization 
w orsens the condition of the poor is through its effect on financial fragility, and ultimately on the 
prevalence of currency, banking and overall financial crises. Many empirical studies find that 
financial liberalization often leads to currency and banking crises [see Grabel, 2003b, and 
references therein]. Chile, Argentina and U ruguay experienced financial collapses follow ing their 
experiments w ith liberalization in the mid-1970s. Since then w e have seen financial crises on the 
heels of liberalization in a great many developing countries, such as Russia, N igeria, Jamaica, 
Republic of Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. Contrary to the orthodox view , the 
financial innovation and associated increase in liquidity that follow  liberalization impart greater risk 
and instability to the financial system and the economy. The promotion of capital markets—
especially w hen they are internationally integrated and liberalized—exacerbates the problem of 
financial fragility that so frequently culminates in crises, the burdens of w hich alw ays fall 
disproportionately on the economically vulnerable and politically w eak groups w ithin society.  
Financial liberalization also can w orsen the situation of the poor by increasing income and 
w ealth inequality and by aggravating existing disparities in political and economic pow er. O nly a 
very small proportion of the population is situated to exploit the opportunities for speculative gain 
available in a liberalized financial environment. Speculation-led development often creates a small 
class of financiers w ho have stronger ties to financial markets abroad than to those in their ow n 
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country. It is also associated w ith shifts in political and economic pow er from non-financial to 
financial actors [Grabel, 2002; H arvey, 2005; Panitch and Gidgin, 2004;]. In such an environment, the 
financial community becomes the anointed arbiter of the ‘national interest’ [Grabel, 2003b]. This 
means that macroeconomic policies that advance the interests of the financial community (such as 
those that promote low  inflation, high interest rates and fiscal restraint) are justified on the basis 
that they serve the broader public interest w hen, in fact, this is rarely the case. Indeed, restrictive 
macroeconomic policies have a disproportionately negative effect on the poor and w omen 
[Braunstein and H eintz, 2006].  
O rthodox economists often herald the disciplining effects of capital markets, arguing that the 
threat of investor exit and corporate takeovers creates pressure to improve corporate governance. 
W e know  that the exit and takeover mechanisms are w ell developed in the markets of the U .S.A. 
and the U .K., but there is simply no evidence to support the argument that these mechanisms have, 
on balance, been beneficial. Indeed, numerous studies find that the threat of investor exit shortens 
the time horizon of managers, w hile takeovers have increased concentration and induced job 
losses. The contention that developing country firms and consumers benefit from the greater 
possibility of exit and takeover is therefore w ithout merit.  
It should also be noted that there is no demonstrated empirical or historical relationship 
betw een a market-based allocation of capital and the satisfaction of grow th and social objectives. 
This is not surprising since the allocation of capital in market-based systems relies on private 
financial returns (i.e., profits) as the single yardstick of investment success. The private financial 
return on an investment can be quite different from its developmental (or w hat w e might term its 
social) return. For example, the developmental return on an investment in the provision of clean 
w ater is likely to exceed its private return. The divergence betw een private and developmental 
returns means that alternatives to the market-based allocation of capital are necessary to promote 
investment that is socially necessary, but not necessarily privately profitable.  
Moreover, despite the claims of orthodox economists, a market-based allocation of capital is 
not a magic cure for inefficiency, w aste and corruption. Liberalization frequently changes the form, 
but not the level, of corruption or inefficiency. The situation of Russia after financial liberalization 
exemplifies this point, but the country is by no means exceptional in this regard [on Russia, see 
Kotz, 1997]. For instance, research on N igeria, Republic of Korea and South America describes quite 
persuasively the corruption that so often flourishes follow ing financial liberalization [Burkett and 
D utt, 1991; Chang, 1998; Crotty and Lee, 2004; Lew is and Stein, 1997]. Thus, financial liberalization 
does not resolve the problem of corruption and the lack of transparency that frequently operate to 
the detriment of the poor. 
As w ith domestic financial liberalization, the case for liberalizing international capital flow s is 
not supported by evidence. N umerous recent cross-country and historical studies demonstrate 
conclusively that there is no reliable empirical relationship betw een the liberalization of capital 
flow s and performance in terms of inflation, economic grow th or investment in developing 
countries [e.g., Eichengreen, 2001; Rodrik, 1998; Lee and Jayadev, 2006]. Moreover, there is now  a 
large body of unambiguous empirical evidence that show s that the liberalization of international 
private capital flow s is strongly associated w ith banking, currency and financial crises [D emirgüc-
Kunt and D etragiache 1998; W eller 2001a].  
Studies also show  that liberalization is associated w ith increases in poverty and inequality, 
though the authors of these studies take care to point out that it is difficult to isolate the negative 
effects of financial liberalization from those associated w ith broader programs of economic 
liberalization (involving, for instance, the simultaneous adoption of trade and labour market 
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liberalization). W ith this caveat it mind, it is w orth noting that W eller and H ersh [2004] find that 
capital and current account liberalization hurt the poor in developing countries in the short run. The 
poor are harmed through a chain of related effects that have been established in several studies.  
Increased short-term international financial flow s (especially portfolio flow s) are often 
associated w ith a greater chance of financial crisis [Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; W eller, 2001a], 
especially in more liberalized environments [D emirgüc-Kunt and D etragiache, 1999]; financial crises 
have disproportionately negative consequences for a country’s poor [Baldacci et al., 2002; 
Frankenberg, et al., 2002]; low -income earners are more likely to be affected by declining demand 
as unemployment rises follow ing a financial crisis [Eichengreen, et al., 1996]; and the poor are the 
first to lose under the fiscal contractions and the last to gain w hen crises subside and fiscal 
spending expands [Ravallion, 2002]. 
Cornia [2003] also finds a good deal of suggestive evidence that financial liberalization has a 
negative impact on the poor (he also brings together evidence from a variety of studies). O f the six 
components of w hat he terms the “liberal package,” Cornia finds that capital account liberalization 
apparently has the strongest impact on w idening w ithin-country inequality. H e finds that the next 
most important negative effects on the poor derive from domestic financial liberalization, follow ed 
by labour market deregulation and tax reform. Finally, W eisbrot et al. [2001] conclude that there is a 
strong prim a facie case that some structural and policy changes implemented during the last tw o 
decades, such as financial liberalization, are at least partly responsible for w orsening grow th and 
health and other social conditions.  
Liberalized financial markets are at least as apt as governments to allocate international capital 
flow s in an inefficient, w asteful or developmentally unproductive manner. In many developing 
countries, readier access to international flow s follow ing liberalization has financed speculation in 
commercial real estate and the stock market, created excess capacity in certain sectors, and 
allow ed domestic banks and investors to take on positions of excessive leverage, often involving 
currency and locational mismatches culminating in crises.  
The liberalization of capital flow s frequently leads to exchange rate problems that spill over to 
other sectors of the economy. U nder a system of market-determined (i.e., floating) exchange rates, 
large, sudden inflow s of capital to a country can pressure the domestic currency to appreciate.  
A large appreciation of the domestic currency is problematic because it can undermine the 
country’s balance of payments position. The flipside of capital inflow s is, of course, the possibility  
of capital outflow s (e.g., dividend payments to foreign investors, interest payments to foreign 
lenders and the liquidation of stock portfolios). Sudden, large capital outflow s can pressure the 
domestic currency to depreciate.  
Capital flight often induces a vicious cycle of additional flight and currency depreciation, debt-
service difficulties and reductions in stock (or other asset) values. Panicked investors tend to  
sell their assets en m asse to avoid the new  capital losses brought about by anticipated future 
depreciations of currency or asset values [Taylor, 1991]. In this manner, capital flight introduces or 
aggravates macroeconomic vulnerabilities and financial instability. This process can culminate in  
a financial crisis, an event that seriously compromises economic performance and living standards 
(particularly for the poor) and often provides a channel for increased foreign influence over 
domestic decision-making.  
Finally, on surveying the data, it becomes obvious that international private capital flow s 
cannot perform the H erculean tasks assumed by orthodox economists. Before turning to the data, 
let us clarify the terminology. International private capital flow s consist of four main types—foreign 
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bank lending, portfolio investment (PI), foreign direct investment (FD I) and remittances. Foreign 
bank lending refers to the loans extended by commercial banks or multilateral institutions to 
domestic public or private sector borrow ers. PI refers to the purchase of stocks, bonds, derivatives 
and other financial instruments issued by the private sector in a country other than that in w hich 
the purchaser resides. In the case of bonds, the instruments can be also be issued by the 
government and purchased by private investors.  
FD I refers to the purchase of a ‘controlling interest’ (defined as at least 10 per cent of the assets) 
in a business in a country other than that in w hich the investor resides. FD I can take tw o forms:  
1) ‘greenfield’ investment, w hich involves the creation of a new  facility, e.g., the construction of a 
factory by a foreign investor; or 2) ‘brow nfield’ investment, namely, mergers and acquisitions that 
involve the purchase of assets of existing domestic firms. The cross-border purchase of real estate is 
also classified as FD I. Private remittances refer to international resource transfers betw een individuals. 
The most common type of remittance occurs w hen a family member w ho is w orking abroad sends 
funds (i.e., w age remittances) to a family member in the home country.  
D ata on international private capital flow s show  that despite the grow th of PI and FD I flow s to 
developing countries during the 1990s, their share of global private capital flow s is still small and 
remains highly concentrated in a few  large countries.3 W ith regard to concentration of FD I, Brazil, 
China, India, Mexico and the Russian Federation received just over 60 per cent of net FD I inflow s to 
all developing countries in 2004, w hile China accounted for one-third of the net FD I inflow s that 
w ent to all developing countries. In 2003/2004, low -income countries received about 11 per cent  
of net FD I and the same percentage of portfolio equity flow s that w ent to all developing countries. 
China, India and South Africa together accounted for 82 per cent of all portfolio equity flow s that 
w ent to developing countries in 2004, w hile China alone accounted for almost 40 per cent of the 
net PI that w ent to all developing countries.  
Inflow s of private remittances are becoming an increasingly important part of the financial 
landscape in some developing countries and regions. As in the case of PI and FD I, remittance 
inflow s are also highly concentrated w ithin a group of developing countries. In terms of the 
dollar value of remittances, the five main recipient countries are India, Mexico, China, Pakistan 
and the Philippines [W orld Bank, 2005]. In 2003 these five countries received almost 84 per cent 
of the remittances that w ent to all developing countries. In 2004 low -income countries received 
35 per cent of the remittances that w ent to all developing countries. This concentration means 
that the potential of many developing countries to harness remittances in the service of pro-poor 
grow th is limited.  
There is no reason to expect these trends in the concentration of international private capital 
flow s to reverse in the near future. Thus, it is imperative that advocates of pro-poor financial policy 
recognize the importance of strategies that both mobilize domestic savings in service of pro-poor 
grow th, and maximize the potential of international private capital flow s received to serve this 
agenda. W e consider such mechanisms in sections 4-6 of this module.  
3  CH A LLEN G ES O F CU RREN T FIN A N CIA L STRU CTU RES 
In many developing countries, the financial structures are failing to promote development and 
poverty reduction. The same can be said of the global financial system. In w hat follow s, w e 
highlight six key problems w ith current financial structures in the developing w orld.4 
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CHALLENGE #1: H IGH  REAL IN TEREST RATES AN D  W ID E IN TEREST RATE SPREAD S  
D espite financial liberalization, interest rate spreads and real interest rates remain very high in a 
number of developing countries. Table 1 show s that in 2003, differences betw een interest rates on 
deposits and those on lending w ere extremely high in a number of poor countries, w hile in many of 
them real interest rates remained above 10 percentage points. 
TABLE 1 
Interest Rate D ifferential and Real Interest Rate, 2003 
Country Deposit Interest Rate 2003 
Lending Interest Rate 
2003 
Real Interest Rate 
2003 
Armenia 6.9 20.8 15.5 
Bangladesh 7.8 16.0 11.0 
Bolivia 11.4 17.7 11.9 
Cambodia 2.0 18.5 15.9 
Cameroon 5.0 18.0 16.9 
CAR 5.0 18.0 14.9 
Gabon 5.0 18.0 19.4 
Honduras 11.5 20.8 11.2 
Kyrgyz Republic 5.0 19.1 14.8 
Lao PDR 6.6 30.5 11.8 
Mongolia 14.0 26.3 20.6 
Nicaragua 5.6 15.5 9.4 
Tanzania 3.0 14.5 8.3 
Uganda 9.8 18.9 8.0 
Zambia 22.0 40.6 17.1 
Source: W orld Developm ent Indicators 2005. Table 5.7. 
 
Clearly, w ith real interest rates and spreads such as these, the financial intermediation process in 
developing countries cannot contribute greatly to real capital formation, and financial intermediation 
certainly cannot speak to the needs of the poor or small- and medium-sized businesses. 
CHALLENGE #2: CRED IT CREATIO N  IS TO O  LO W  
In many poor countries, high spreads and real interest rates are associated w ith relatively low  rates 
of credit creation. Table 2 show s that in low -income countries, including sub-Saharan Africa, 
interest rate spreads and the amounts of credit available lag behind other regions of the w orld, 
w here financial conditions are more favourable. In most of sub-Saharan Africa, domestic credit 
creation to the private sector is low er than the 63.7 per cent of GD P show n because the high rate in 
South Africa substantially raises the average for the rest of the region (See Tables 2 and 3). 
TABLE 2 
Perform ance Indicators of Financial Institutions, 2003 
 Low-Income 
Countries 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
South Africa South Asia East Asia 
and the 
Pacific 
Middle-
Income 
Countries 
Domestic Credit to the 
Private Sector 
(% of GDP) 
27.0 63.7 158.2 31.0 123.6 64.2 
Interest Rate Spreada  
(percentage points) 12.4 12.4 5.2 7.3 5.2 6.3 
Sources: McKinley, 2005. W orld Bank, W orld Developm ent Indicators 2005, Table 5.5  
N ote: ‘a’ lending minus deposit rate. 
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Table 3 provides country-by-country and country-group information concerning domestic 
credit to the private sector overall, and domestic credit from the banking sector to the overall 
economy, including the government. For a large number of countries and for low  income countries 
as a w hole, there has been very little increase, and, in many cases, a decrease in the amount of 
credit to the private sector and to the economy as a w hole from banks, the dominant financial 
institution in these countries. By contrast, in the middle and high income countries, there has been 
a substantial increase. 
TABLE 3 
D om estic Credit Provided to the Private Sector and Credit Provided by the Banking Sector,  
Percentage of G D P, 1990 and 2003 
Country Domestic Credit to 
the Private Sector 
1990 
Domestic Credit to 
the Private Sector 
2003 
Domestic Credit 
Provided by the 
Banking Sector 
1990 
Domestic Credit 
Provided by the 
Banking Sector 
2003 
Armenia 40.4 6.0 58.7 5.5 
Bangladesh 16.7 28.8 23.9 38.4 
Bolivia 24.0 49.0 30.7 60.0 
Cambodia --- 7.9 --- 7.2 
Cameroon 26.7 10.2 31.2 16.0 
CAR 7.2 5.9 12.9 14.7 
Gabon 13.0 10.8 20.0 17.5 
Honduras 31.1 40.6 40.9 37.7 
Kyrgyz Republic --- 4.8 --- 11.4 
Lao PDR 1.0 6.5 5.1 10.1 
Mongolia 19.0 30.3 72.4 38.0 
Nicaragua 112.6 26.4 206.6 96.5 
Tanzania 13.9 7.6 34.6 8.4 
Uganda 4.0 6.9 17.8 12.5 
Zambia 8.9 6.7 67.8 38.2 
Low Income 22.3 27.0 44.3 45.3 
Middle Income 43.0 64.2 64.3 85.3 
High Income 125.8 158.3 153.1 181.9 
Source: W orld Developm ent Indicators 2005. Table 5.7; Table 5.5. 
 
In most of these countries, credit creation relative to GD P fell betw een 1990 and 2003, w hile 
for all low  income countries, it rose somew hat, but is still at low  levels relative to other regions of 
the w orld. 
CHALLENGE #3: GLO BAL SAVINGS ARE SEVERELY MISALLO CATED  
Are savings rates too low ? In some cases yes, but a more serious issue is that savings are severely 
misallocated globally. As table 4 show s, in recent years a handful of rich countries, most notably the 
U nited States, has been running savings shortfalls relative to investment, w hile many other regions 
of the w orld have been saving more than they have been investing. As a result, poorer countries 
have become net lenders of resources to the U nited States, or have borrow ed from the rest of the 
w orld much less than they had in earlier periods. In short, globally speaking, resources are being 
shifted from most of the w orld, including many relatively poor or middle income countries, to the 
U nited States. In recent years, then, the U nited States has been utilizing an enormous share of the 
w orld's savings. As Aizenman et al. [2004] confirm, most developing countries self-finance their 
ow n investment, making little productive use of the global capital market. Yet, as w e have just 
seen, many poor countries are not being served w ell by domestic financial markets either. 
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TABLE 4 
Trends in Savings, Investm ent and N et Lending Per cent of G D P 
Category Investment 
1983-1990 
Saving 
1983-1990 
Net 
Lending 
1983-1990 
Investment 
1991-1998 
Saving 
1991-1998 
Net 
Lending 
1991-1998 
Investment 
2004 
Saving 
2004 
Net 
Lending 
2004 
World 24.2 22.9 -- 24.0 22.9 -- 24.6 24.9 -- 
Industrialized 
Countries 
22.7 22.1 -0.6 21.6 21.1 -0.5 20.7 19.4 -1.8 
- US 20.2 17.5 -2.8 18.5 16.1 -2.4 19.6 13.6 -6.0 
- Euro Area … … …   0.3 20.2 20.9 0.7 
- Japan 29.7 32.5 2.8 29.2 31.6 2.4 23.9 27.6 3.7 
- Newly 
Industrialized 
Asia 
28.0 34.3 6.2 31.8 33.8 2.0 24.9 31.3 6.4 
Developing 
and Transition 
Economics 
26.2 24.2 -1.9 27.5 25.4 0.4 29.2 31.5 2.3 
- Africa 21.6 18.5 -3.1 20.1 16.6 -3.5 21.0 20.6 -0.4 
- Developing 
Asia 
28.6 25.7 -2.9 32.8 31.3 -1.6 35.5 38.2 2.7 
- Middle 
East 
23.0 17.5 -5.4 25.6 22.9 -2.6 25.4 32.0 2.7 
- Latin 
America 
20.4 19.5 -0.9 21.2 18.3 -2.8 19.8 21.0 1.2 
- CISa --- --- --- 16.2b 24.2 b 8.0 b 21.4 29.4 8.0 
Source: IMF, W orld Econom ic O utlook 2005, Table 43, pp. 271-273. 
D eveloping and Transition Economies include Central and Eastern Europe and Russia;  
N ote: a`': includes Russia; b`': D enotes 1999. D ata not available earlier. 
 
As Table 4 show s, Africa is still a net borrow er of funds and its overall savings rate is low er than 
that of the rest of the w orld. This is not surprising given the profound poverty that characterizes so 
many countries on the continent. In principle, therefore, mobilizing more savings in sub-Saharan 
Africa should be an important goal. H ow ever, if these savings failed to translate into domestic 
investment and w ent overseas instead, then raising the savings rate w ould do little for grow th or 
for the poor. Especially in Africa, capital flight is a severe problem [Boyce and N dikumana, 2001]. 
Capital management techniques, as w e discuss in section 6, can help stem this capital flight. 
CHALLENGE #4: CRED IT AN D  CAPITAL FLO W S ARE PRO -CYCLICAL 
W hen capital flow s do come into many developing countries, they are often short-term and pro-
cyclical and are sometimes associated w ith ‘sudden-stops’. These, in turn, can lead to financial 
crises capable of having devastating economic impacts, especially for w omen and the poor. [Palma, 
2000; O campo, 2003; and Singh and Zammit, 2000]. Estimates place the average cost of a severe 
financial crisis at 10 per cent of GN P [Rodrik, 2006]. The threat of such destabilizing crises leads 
many countries to accumulate large amounts of foreign exchange reserves w hich are very costly to 
hold and could be better spent on domestic investment [McKinley, 2006]. 
CHALLENGE #5: ABSEN CE O F LO NG-TERM, ‘PATIEN T’ CAPITAL 
Short-term, unstable flow s of international capital represent a more general and severe problem 
facing many developing countries—namely, a dearth of long-term, patient capital to support long-
term investment [Stallings and Studart, 2006]. Most capital is of a highly short-term nature, 
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especially in the poorest countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. As a result, long-term 
productive investment is extremely difficult and costly to finance. 
CHALLENGE #6: IN SUFFICIEN T CAPITAL FO R SMALL AN D  MED IUM  
EN TERPRISES AN D  PO O R H O USEH O LD S 
Finally, there is a lack of capital for small and medium enterprises and the poor in most regions of 
the w orld [Stallings and Studart, 2006]. This problem flow s from many of the ‘stylized facts’ 
described earlier: high real interest rates and interest rate spreads, misallocation of global financial 
resources, the short-term and pro-cyclical nature of international capital flow s, and the absence of 
long-term, patient capital. 
Pro-poor financial policies must solve many of the problems discussed here in order to 
succeed. In sections 4-6 of this module, w e describe a range of policies that can help meet these 
challenges. W e also survey various experiences w ith financial institutions and policies that have 
been associated w ith developmental finance, as w ell as assess their successes and failures. W e w ill 
see that these policies tended to be the most successful w hen they satisfied several conditions: 
• They had strong monitoring mechanisms in place to increase the likelihood that they 
could achieve their goals. 
• They operated in a context of robust aggregate demand so that there w as a facilitating 
environment for economic grow th. 
• They also operated in a domestic and international environment in w hich there w as 
not a large degree of instability. 
• They w ere part of a coherent overall developmental plan implemented by the 
government.  
4  M O BILIZIN G  A N D  CH A N N ELLIN G  SA VIN G S FO R PRO -PO O R G RO W TH :  
A  CO N SID ERA TIO N  O F PO LICY O PTIO N S5 
D omestic financial policy in developing countries should be driven by the follow ing objectives: the 
financial system should operate in the service of sustainable, stable and equitable economic 
grow th, and it should place improvement of the living standards of the poor at the heart of its 
operations. The chief function of the domestic financial sector in developing countries is to provide 
finance in adequate quantities and at appropriate prices for public and private investments and for 
social expenditures that are central to a pro-poor grow th agenda. D omestic financial policies that 
mobilize and channel domestic savings should therefore be evaluated according to the extent to 
w hich they serve these ends. Any domestic financial reforms that improve the functioning of the 
financial system along other dimensions (such as enhancing its liquidity and international 
integration) should be secondary to the primary goal of promoting pro-poor grow th. 
In w hat follow s, w e w ill see that there are numerous w ays that domestic financial policy can be 
oriented tow ards a pro-poor grow th agenda. Before turning to specific policies, how ever, there are 
three general points to make about all of the policy options that w e present here. 
First, the appropriate mix of domestic financial policies for any one country depends on its 
unique national conditions. Most important among these are the character and institutional 
structure of the national financial architecture; institutional, regulatory and administrative 
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capacities; and historical, political and economic conditions. Simply put: there is no single template 
for domestic financial policy—w hat is a feasible, desirable, appropriate approach to policy in one 
country may not w ork in another.  
Second, in this module w e discuss policy options for the domestic financial sector, for central 
banks, and for international capital flow s separately. In practice, there is a strong element of 
complementarity among these three components of the overall financial environment. Indeed, the 
success of policy initiatives in one particular domain depends critically on the success of enabling 
or supporting policies in the other domains. For instance, w e w ill see in section 5 of this module 
that a developmental central bank is critical to the success of many of the policies tow ard the 
domestic financial sector discussed in this section. Similarly, w e w ill see in section 6 of this module 
that certain policies tow ards international capital flow s (such as those that restrict outflow s) 
buttress efforts to mobilize domestic savings.  
There is also a complementarity betw een fiscal policies (see module #1) and efforts to mobilize 
domestic savings. For instance, fiscal policies that promote domestic savings and enhance the 
collection of taxes from the w ealthy and from large firms (especially the foreign firms that are too 
often granted tax holidays) necessarily increase the available pool of resources that can be 
allocated tow ards activities that serve a pro-poor grow th agenda.  
Third, monitoring, performance assessment and policy dynamism are critical to the success of 
and political support for all of the policies discussed in sections 4-6 of this module. Evidence from 
many countries show s that development banks and other specialized banks, programs of direct 
credit allocation, lending targets, credit guarantees, loan subsidies, tax credits and state subsidies 
for targeted lending can all be managed and regulated effectively if the government and the 
banking sector have the ability and commitment to monitor and assess these initiatives 
consistently. The maintenance of transparent and consistently enforced performance targets is 
extremely important to ensuring that the policy measures discussed here can achieve their stated 
goals. The design of assessment measures and the technical ability to carry them out should be an 
integral part of the process of designing financial policies—these measures should not be an 
afterthought that is hastily patched together once policymakers have become aw are of certain 
problems, such as the misallocation of resources.  
Equally important to policy success is a commitment to dynamic, rather than static, 
approaches to financial policy [see Grabel, 2004; Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2004; and discussion in 
section 6 of this module]. That is, policymakers should maintain a commitment to strengthening, 
w eakening or even phasing out financial policies w hen the economic environment changes in a 
w ay that renders old strategies no longer useful or viable or w hen the objectives of a policy have 
been achieved.  
It is critical to acknow ledge that the challenges of effectively monitoring and adjusting policies 
are neither greater nor lesser than the challenges associated w ith managing private banks and 
international capital flow s in a volatile, liberalized environment. This is a point often overlooked by 
orthodox economists w hen they quickly reject the kinds of policies that w e discuss here on the 
grounds that they do not have a proven track record or that developing countries have insufficient 
institutional capacity to manage them.  
W ith these three considerations in mind, w e w ill now  describe a range of strategies tow ard the 
domestic financial sector that can be used to mobilize and/or allocate domestic savings in the 
service of a pro-poor grow th agenda. 
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4.1  D EPO SIT IN SURAN CE TO  EN HAN CE CO N FID EN CE IN  TH E BAN KING SYSTEM 
McKinley [2005] calls attention to the difficulty that banks in developing countries confront in 
trying to mobilize deposits. There are many reasons for this, and one of the most important of these 
is a lack of a properly funded deposit insurance system. There is every reason to believe that a 
properly funded and managed system of deposit insurance could help overcome the public’s lack 
of confidence in the domestic banking system, and thereby contribute to an increase in the deposit 
base available for bank lending [McKinley, 2005, p. 24].  
4.2  D IRECT CRED IT ALLO CATIO N  AN D  SU BSID IZED  LEN D IN G  
There are many w ays that governments can and have influenced the price and allocation of credit 
in accordance w ith their economic and social goals. Interest rate controls and programs for the 
direct allocation of credit from the government to key sectors and firms w ere central to the 
improvement of living standards and to the attainment of grow th and industrialization goals in 
Japan, in most Continental European and East and Southeast Asian countries, and in Brazil during 
the post-W W II era [see Chang and Grabel; 2004; Stiglitz 1994; Chang, 1994; W ade, 1990]. More 
recently, China, Taiw an Province of China (PO C) and India have all used programs for direct credit 
allocation successfully [see Epstein et al., 2004 for details]. All of the governments mentioned have 
also subsidized lending in accordance w ith various economic and social goals.  
4.3  LEN D ING TARGETS AN D  CEILIN GS, AN D  TAX IN CEN TIVES 
Lending targets or tax credits can promote bank lending in support of a range of identified 
economic and social goals through a number of means. Government influence over loan allocation 
can involve the establishment of transparent lending targets that are imposed on private, quasi-
private or publicly controlled banks. Today, such programs are in place in a number of countries. 
For instance, in India, N epal, Pakistan and, to some extent, the Philippines, banks are required to 
channel significant proportions of their loan portfolios to agriculture and other sectors identified as 
disadvantaged.6 In India, all commercial banks and regional rural banks are required to lend 40 per 
cent of net bank credit to identified priority sectors. W ithin this 40 per cent target, at least 18 per 
cent of net bank credit must go to agricultural borrow ers, 10 per cent must be extended to 
identified ‘w eaker’ sectors (namely, small and marginal farmers, rural artisans and agricultural 
labourers), and the remaining 12 per cent must be allocated either to the previously mentioned 
types of borrow ers or to small-scale industry. O f the lending to small-scale industry, 40 per cent 
must be allocated to w hat is termed ‘tiny’ industry.  
The tax system can also be used to direct credit tow ard those projects that fall w ithin a  
pro-poor grow th agenda. Tax incentives can encourage banks to lend to certain types of firms  
or sectors, or to particular social groups, such as the poor, first-time entrepreneurs, w omen and 
ethnic minorities.  
Another strategy that can be employed by governments is the establishment of ceilings on the 
percentage of bank loan portfolios that can support activities in ‘non-priority’ sectors or activities, 
such as securities trading, real estate or off-shore investments. For example, Taiw an PO C had such a 
program in place from 1989 to 1995. The lending ceiling limited the ability of banks to lend to the 
real estate sector. This ceiling w as introduced follow ing the development of a real estate bubble 
that caused fears of financial instability [for details on Taiw an PO C, see Epstein et al., 2004; Chin and 
N ordhaug, 2002]. Governments can also preclude all banks or certain types of banks from 
participating in non-priority sectors, such as securities trading.  
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4.4  SPECIALIZED  LEN D ING IN STITU TIO N S AN D  D EVELO PMEN T BAN KS 
Specialized lending institutions can be established to serve particular mandates. These might 
include encouraging entrepreneurship among w omen, minorities or the poor, supporting the 
development of SMEs, or promoting the development of new  technologies (such as those that 
encourage favourable environmental outcomes).7 
Another means of ensuring the provision of finance to particular sectors or firms is through 
the creation of development banks w ith narrow  mandates. D evelopment banks can be publicly 
financed and managed as in Brazil, Republic of Korea, Japan and France, or can be privately 
financed as in the case of German industrial banks. It is also conceivable that these banks could 
be organized as public-private hybrids and could raise capital on international markets and even 
from private donors.  
D evelopment banks are the institutional counterpart of the industrial policies and public 
investment programs that have been critical to the success of late developing (or ‘new ly 
industrializing’) countries, as the experiences of several countries suggest. W e w ill now  consider  
the performance of development banks in the ‘developmental states’ of the post-w ar period.  
Amsden [2001] describes how  many late industrializing countries developed a manufacturing 
base and rapidly industrialized after W W II (eventually moving into mid-level and even high-
technology production) thanks to state efforts to harness the domestic financial system in order to 
mobilize and allocate medium- and long-term finance for industrialization. She show s that 
policymakers in these developmental states utilized stringent controls and monitoring mechanisms 
to ensure that the investment projects and firms that received finance from development banks 
w ere at the heart of the state’s industrialization goals. W here development banks w ere most 
successful they w ere supported by developmental central banks (see section 5 of this module) and 
firm performance standards. The latter often involved export targets—firms that failed to meet 
their targets w ere often denied further access to subsidized loans.  
Amsden argues that development banking filled the void left by the absence of other financial 
institutions in the post-w ar environment, pointing out that these banks initially invested in key 
infrastructure that later generated demand for local labour and inputs that created business groups 
and local know ledge. Furthermore, development bankers themselves learned important skills such 
as project appraisal in the course of their operations (ibid., p. 126). It is important to note that 
foreign direct investment played a relatively minor role in post-w ar industrialization and capital 
formation. Instead, the state, public investment and development banks w ere the prime movers of 
the industrialization process.8  
D evelopment banks raised capital at home or abroad and then utilized it either to purchase 
equity in private or public firms or to lend to such firms at below  market interest rates. The 
lending terms of development banks w ere almost alw ays concessionary [ibid., p. 132]. Effective 
real interest rates w ere often low , even negative. The public finance of development banks in 
many developmental states w as often ‘off-budget’ and related to non-tax revenues. It derived 
from foreign sources, deposits in government-ow ned banks, postal savings accounts and 
pension funds. Especially in East Asia, these revenues often lay outside the general budget and 
parliamentary process, thereby strengthening the hand of professional bureaucrats, as in post-
w ar France and Japan.  
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Governments in developmental states also controlled non-tax-related sources of funding, such 
as foreign borrow ing (through loan guarantees), ow nership of financial institutions and the 
disposal of private savings (for example, through postal savings banks) [ibid., p. 133; 135]. 
According to Amsden, the major w eakness of development banks w as not that they spent on the 
w rong industries, but that, in some cases, they spent too much overall. [Also see Stallings and 
Studart, 2006].  
Finally, the state played a central role in long-term credit allocation in the post-w ar era, even 
in those parts of the w orld w here development banks w ere of relatively minor importance (e.g., 
Malaysia, Thailand, Taiw an and Turkey) [Amsden, 2001]. In these cases, the entire banking sector 
in these countries w as mobilized to direct long-term credit to targeted industries, thereby "acting 
as a surrogate development bank" [ibid., p. 129].  
Mechanisms to finance public investment programs can be created through fiscal policy 
reforms (see Training Module #1). Public debt market reforms can also play a role in this 
connection, as Epstein and H eintz’s [2006] w ork on Ghana suggests. In the case of Ghana, they 
suggest that the government develop longer-term public debt instruments as a w ay of low ering 
interest costs (w hich are high on short-term instruments) and as a means of raising funds to finance 
public investment. This proposal has obvious relevance outside the Ghanaian context. 
4.5  CRED IT GUARAN TEE SCH EMES TO  RED UCE RISK PREMIA O N   
MED IUM- AN D  LO NG-TERM IN VESTMEN TS 
Banks in developing countries are often unw illing to extend credit to medium- and long-term 
investments because of the perceived risks and the availability of substitute assets, such as 
Treasury bills, that have high returns and are less risky. O ne w ay of reducing the risk associated 
w ith these investments (and thereby encourage lending over the medium- and long-term) is to 
have the government guarantee a portion of the loan to support approved projects. In a U N D P-
sponsored study of Ghana, Epstein and H eintz [2006] propose public underw riting of loans to 
low er risk premia on investments that support the objectives of employment creation and 
poverty reduction. Their proposal has relevance beyond this national environment, and w e 
therefore reproduce it here.  
In a credit guarantee program, the interest charged on guaranteed loans w ould be low er than 
the prevailing market rate. The appropriate level for the concessional interest rate w ould be a 
w eighted average of the market rate of interest for the type of loan extended and the risk-free rate 
of return on government securities. At this rate of interest, the program w ould not place any 
economic burden on the banks that participated in the guarantee scheme. H ow ever, it does 
suggest that the low est possible interest rate w ould be the prevailing rate on government 
securities (for a 100 per cent secured loan). Therefore, such a credit guarantee program could only 
low er the cost of borrow ing so far. The program w ould therefore be more effective if paired w ith 
other strategies to reduce the average costs of borrow ing throughout the economy (on the latter 
issue, see below ).  
In a credit guarantee program, borrow ers w ould be required to supply some form of collateral, 
even if a large portion of the loan w ere guaranteed. This is an important mechanism for ensuring that 
loan guarantees do not create perverse incentives. The collateral requirements w ould be less 
stringent than for other types of loans. Coupled w ith monitoring and performance targets, the 
collateral requirement could reduce the perverse incentives for borrow ers associated w ith loan 
guarantees (and the potential drain on public resources if the loan w ere to become non-performing).  
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4.5.1  H ow  Can Borrow ing Costs Be Low ered?  
A reduction in domestic interest rates is an important part of a pro-poor grow th agenda, 
particularly because low er interest rates can support some of the programs considered here, such 
as credit guarantee schemes. Certainly incomes and competition policies might be necessary w ere 
reductions in the average interest rate to raise inflation rates beyond a moderate level [Pollin et al., 
2006; McKinley, 2005].  
Average borrow ing costs could be reduced through a number of means. W e know  that it 
w ould be far easier for central banks to low er their prime lending rates w ere programs of inflation 
targeting to be abandoned (see Training Module #2 and section #5 of this Module) [Pollin et al., 
2006; McKinley, 2005]. The introduction or strengthening of competition policies could also 
address banking sector concentration, and thereby also create the possibility that average interest 
rates in the economy could be reduced [Epstein and H eintz, 2006; McKinley, 2005]. Enhancing the 
competitiveness of the process by w hich government debt w ere sold (e.g., through government 
auctions) could also promote reductions in average interest rates because governments w ould not 
be able to influence auction outcomes.  
Interest rates on desired types of assets can be low ered through a number of means considered 
in this section of the module. Credit guarantees of the sort described here, asset based reserve 
requirements (see section 4.6) and direct subsidies or concessionary loan rates for especially desirable 
projects (see section 4.2) are all w ays that interest rates on some types of projects can be reduced. 
N ote that direct subsidies or concessionary loan rates can be an expensive undertaking, but there 
may be particular cases, such as for projects w ith especially large employment multipliers, w here 
such measures may be w orthw hile [McKinley, 2005, p. 23; Pollin et al., 2006]. 
4.6  VARIABLE ASSET-BASED  RESERVE REQ U IREMEN TS 
Another means to ensure that the domestic financial system serves the objectives discussed above 
is through a system of variable asset-based reserve requirements for financial firms. A system of 
variable asset-based reserve requirements has three chief components: 1) all financial firms in  
the economy are required to hold differential reserves against different types of assets in their 
portfolio, such as stocks, bonds, mortgage, consumer, or small business loans; 2) financial 
regulators establish and manipulate the required reserve ratio against each type of asset based  
on government objectives vis-à-vis encouraging certain types of investments (for example, in 
employment-intensive sectors) and their evaluation of a number of factors, such as the risk 
associated w ith that asset and market conditions; and 3) required reserves are held in non-interest 
bearing deposit accounts at the central bank.  
Variable asset-based reserves provide regulators w ith a means to encourage financial 
institutions to hold certain types of assets by reducing the ratio of required reserves that must be 
held against them, and thereby low ering the cost of holding certain assets (and vice versa). Variable 
asset-based reserves provide regulators w ith a means to target sectoral imbalances involving 
over—investment in some sectors and under—investment in others, as w ell as w ith a means to use 
the financial system in the service of economic and social goals.  
A system of variable asset-based reserves can also reduce the risk of financial crisis through tw o 
channels. Regulators can use the asset-based reserve requirements to deflate bubbles in particular 
asset markets as they emerge and before they culminate in financial crises. The system also 
functions as an automatic stabilizer because it requires financial institutions to deposit additional 
reserve holdings w henever asset values rise or w henever new  types of assets are created.  
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4.7  EMPLO YMEN T-O RIEN TED  FIN AN CIAL PO LICIES: D ESCRIPTIO N  O F  
A PLAN  D EVELO PED  FO R SO UTH  AFRICA  
As a concrete example of some of these policies, w e w ill briefly describe a set of financial market 
interventions developed by Pollin, et. al. [2006]. They propose a set of employment-oriented 
financial policies capable of contributing to the South African government's goal of reducing 
unemployment by half in ten years. This plan puts forw ard a set of credit allocation policies 
designed to target employment-generating projects. The proposal has clear relevance outside  
of the South African context. For this reason, w e describe it in some detail below .  
The plan outlines three main policy tools to channel credit to targeted industries at 
concessionary rates w ith the goal of generating employment. A first policy tool is a major 
expansion in the lending activity and developmental focus of the country's currently existing 
development banks. The Industrial D evelopment Corporation is South Africa's largest development 
bank. Its 2005 Annual Report reported that through its lending activity over 2004-05 it anticipated 
creating 16,700 jobs. H ow ever, this is far too modest a contribution for such an important 
institution, given that the official statistic of 4.3 million unemployed people in 2005 is 257 times 
larger than this figure of 16,700. The capitalization of these banks therefore needs to increase, so 
they should be allow ed to assume a higher level of risk on behalf of an employment-targeted 
grow th agenda. 
A second policy tool for channelling credit is the establishment of asset reserve requirements 
for private banks and other financial institutions (see section 4.6). For example, the plan stipulates 
that banks should hold 25 per cent of their loan portfolio in designated employment-generating 
activities. If the subsidized activities accounted for less than 25 per cent of a bank’s total loan 
portfolio, the bank w ould have to cover this gap by holding cash. Features of this proposal are 
comparable to the system of ‘prescribed assets’ that operated in South Africa from 1956 to1989. 
H ow ever, the Pollin et al. [2006] plan proposes more flexible measures (for example, it allow s banks 
that hold more than 25 per cent of their loans in subsidized activities to sell permits to institutions 
w hose targeted industries account for below  the 25 per cent minimum of subsidized loans). 
A third tool for channelling credit is a major expansion of the government's system of loan 
guarantees. The South African government currently has a loan guarantee program but it is far too 
small. U nder the government's current loan guarantee program, the accruals on its contingent 
liabilities—i.e., the amounts that the government actually pays w hen loans default—has been a  
trivial cost, amounting, on average, to 1/100 of one per cent or less over the recent past. The plan 
described here proposes the follow ing program instead. The government underw rites about R40 
billion per year in loans, i.e., a figure approximately equal to 25 per cent of fixed capital formation 
as of 2004. The plan assumes a default rate on these loans of 15 per cent and loan guarantees 
covering 75 per cent of the principal on defaulted debts. W ithin this scenario, it follow s that the 
accruals to the government w ould amount to R4.5 billion/year (i.e., R40 billion x .15 x .75). This is a 
crucial result. It show s that the government has the capacity to underw rite a major loan guarantee 
program, roughly equivalent to 25 per cent of productive investment in the economy, w ith a 
financial commitment of no more than 1-2 per cent of its fiscal budget. 
These three parts of the credit allocation plan amount to having the financial sector subsidize 
credit for certain borrow ers. Three key issues arise in this connection: 1) w ho should receive the 
subsidized credit? 2) w hich institutions should allocate the credit?; and 3) w hat monitoring should 
be put in place to ensure that the funds are w ell spent and achieve their desired goals, namely, 
facilitating pro-poor grow th? 
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W ho should receive subsidized credit? The fundamental purpose of the expanded credit 
allocation policies is to facilitate a program of rapid employment grow th. Subsidized credit should 
be directed tow ard viable businesses that w ill expand employment. 
The plan proposes that businesses, including co-operatives and non-profit organizations, be 
eligible for credit based on tw o criteria. The first is ‘social priority lending’ for small-scale activities. 
Three areas that fall under this heading are: land reform and rural development, w hich w ould help 
generate and build assets for the rural poor; the promotion of SMEs, a basic challenge for many 
developing countries and one that should be part of any pro-poor financial policy [Stallings and 
Studart, 2006]; and the promotion of collectives and other alternative ow nership forms, since for 
the poor, new  and alternative ow nership forms can be crucial to individual efforts to leave poverty 
behind by generating asset ow nership and employment. 
The second criterion stipulates that a firm that does not meet the ‘social priority’ criterion w ill 
be eligible for concessionary loans if it can demonstrate that its project w ill produce large positive 
employment effects. Thus, to apply for a loan under this program, a firm w ould have to provide an 
employment impact statement demonstrating the overall number of jobs to be created by its 
investment. The employment impact statement should include both the direct and indirect job 
effects of the project to be financed by the loan. 
W ho w ould provide the loans? According to this plan, both public and private financial 
institutions w ould provide these loans. There are currently a number of development banks and 
public and quasi-public financial institutions in South Africa. O ne of the largest is the Industrial 
D evelopment Corporation, w hich has committed itself to expanding its developmental role in 
general, including its role in job creation [Mondi, 2006]. The plan w ould involve expanding the  
role of the development banks, such as the Industrial D evelopment Corporation, in employment 
creation, as w ell as mobilizing the private financial system through loan guarantees and asset 
reserve requirements.  
The plan w ould also encourage small-scale banking, a so-called second tier of institutions, to 
enter the market, perhaps w ith the support of the Reserve Bank of South Africa (see section 5 of this 
module). D evelopment banks could encourage this second tier banking system by investing in the 
creation and expansion of such institutions. 
The program of loan guarantees w ould underw rite an expansion of R40 billion and aim for a 
default rate of 15 per cent, w hile the government w ould guarantee 75 per cent of the principal. The 
cost w ould be about R4.5 billion/year, w hich comes to about 1.2 per cent of government spending. 
This is significant, but the goal w ould be to generate thousands of jobs that w ould expand both the 
economy and government revenue. 
An advantage of this plan is that it w ould be profitable to private lenders as w ell as help to 
expand credit and employment. H ow ever, to guarantee its efficacy, careful monitoring systems 
w ould have to be set up. The plan proposes that these include a series of employment targets, 
escrow  accounts, rew ards for w histle blow ers w ho report corruption, and penalties for those w ho 
do not meet the targets (readers are encouraged to see Pollin et al. [2006] for details on measures 
to reduce corruption, fraud and inefficiency since these may be relevant in some contexts). 
Those receiving priority lending w ould be required to deposit part of the loan in escrow  
accounts, w ith the balance to be returned on repayment of the loan. The size of the escrow  
required w ould be inversely related to the size of the subsidy the government chose to grant  
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to the borrow er. In addition to setting the size of the escrow  account, the lender w ould engage in 
normal monitoring of the loan. For large-scale employment loans (that is, granted to firms that 
produced employment impact statements), monitoring w ould be oriented tow ards assuring that 
the firms fulfilled their employment creation promises.  
4.8  IMPRO VEMEN T O F BU SIN ESS SERVICES AN D  IN FO RMATIO N  RESO URCES  
TO  FACILITATE LEN D IN G TO  SMEs9 
The lack of skills, technical support and adequate information among SMEs limits the w illingness of 
banks to lend to such enterprises. Thus, there is a need to develop capacity for technical assistance, 
particularly in terms of managing the risks faced by SMEs. For example, legislation could be 
enacted requiring all banks to have an effectively functioning desk to deal w ith SME applications. 
Specific parameters w ould be set to evaluate w hether banks w ere complying w ith the regulations. 
Similarly, government could spearhead policies in support of the establishment of credit bureaux 
to collect and maintain information on potential borrow ers. These credit bureaux could be 
designed to deal specifically w ith the information problems associated w ith small-scale credit 
applications. The credit bureaux could be charged w ith facilitating financial services betw een 
lenders and potential borrow ers. 
4.9  FO RGING LIN KAGES BETW EEN  IN FO RMAL AN D  FO RMAL FIN AN CIAL IN STITU TIO N S10 
In some countries, informal financial institutions presently fill important needs-namely, they 
provide credit (though often at high cost) to rural communities and to small businesses. The 
informal financial sector may have an advantage over the formal financial sector in making small 
loans. H ow ever, the lending capacity of the informal sector is clearly limited because its deposit 
base is necessarily small [Selvavinayagam, 1995]. Policymakers in developing countries have tw o 
options w hen it comes to the informal financial sector: they can either increase the ability of 
informal financial institutions to perform their traditional functions, or they can enhance the ability 
of the state and/or the formal financial sector to mobilize and channel capital to the underserved 
rural communities and small businesses. The latter strategy is clearly preferable, but w e appreciate 
that the former may be more feasible in some contexts, especially in the short run. For this 
pragmatic reason, w e w ill now  describe some strategies for enhancing the performance of  
the informal financial sector.  
By w ay of background, w e should acknow ledge that informal financial institutions have 
diverse organizational structures and that they interact w ith formal institutions in a variety of  
w ays. In some cases, informal financial institutions closely resemble formal institutions w ith  
regard to their scale of operation and average loan size. Interestingly, large-scale informal financial 
institutions have lent substantial sums to medium-sized enterprises in Taiw an PO C [Tang, 1995]. 
These informal financial institutions have been encouraged by the government [Biggs. 1991; 
Pickbourn, 2006].  
In some contexts, informal financial institutions may compete w ith or substitute for the 
services provided by formal financial institutions.11 In other cases, complementarities betw een 
informal and formal financial institutions exist. For example, formal financial institutions may lend 
informally mobilized deposits or informal lenders may act as intermediaries for formal institutions 
[Aryeetey 2003]. In still other cases, there is little—if any—interaction betw een formal and informal 
financial institutions due to the fragmented nature of financial markets in some developing 
countries [Aryeetey, 1998; Selvavinayagam, 1995].  
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Policymakers w ho choose to enhance the performance of the informal financial sector w ould 
do w ell to develop complementary linkages betw een informal and formal institutions. For instance, 
relationships could be built betw een formal banks and rotating savings and credit associations to 
facilitate group savings and lending for informal and small enterprise development [Amoako-
Tuffour, 2002; Aryeetey, 1998]. Aryeetey [1998] suggests that formal banks could encourage 
informal institutions to place their deposits w ith them by offering a preferential deposit interest 
rate and by w aiving fees on their demand deposits. In addition, he suggests that agency-type 
relationships could be developed among w ell-established informal, semi-formal (e.g., N GO s and 
microfinance) institutions and formal lenders. In this scenario, formal banks w ould channel some  
of their funds to semi-formal and informal lenders for lending to small borrow ers.  
Aryeetey rightly suggests that only recognizable, w ell-established informal lenders should 
be involved in such a program, namely lending associations, cooperatives and unions. H e also 
suggests that other mechanisms for forging linkages betw een formal and informal financial 
institutions might involve creating tax incentives to compensate formal banks for the costs and 
risks of developing small borrow er portfolios (i.e., by offering tax relief to formal banks that 
allocate credit through semi-formal and informal agents) and modifying certain restrictions as  
to the types of assets that formal financial institutions can hold to encourage them to invest in 
semi-formal institutions. 
N ote that developing these new  institutional relationships betw een formal and informal 
financial institutions w ould require a broader regulatory structure for suppliers of credit, one that 
w ould specifically incorporate a role for informal credit institutions in those countries w here such 
institutions are currently playing important roles. At this point, the lack of prudential regulation of 
informal financial institutions may hinder the w illingness of formal institutions to increase their  
ties w ith informal institutions. It w ould therefore be important for policymakers to develop an 
appropriate regulatory framew ork for informal financial institutions, particularly in those cases 
w here they have chosen to increase the linkages betw een formal and informal institutions.  
There is much research to be done on the issue of regulating informal institutions. Preliminary 
w ork along these lines appears in Lapenu [2002] and especially in D aley-H arris [2002, ch. 6]. The 
latter argues that it is important to establish industry norms and standards for unregulated 
microfinance institutions (MFIs), as w ell as to develop appropriate means to reinforce these 
performance standards. D aley-H arris [2002] proposes specific performance indicators and norms 
that can be used by regulators for monitoring the microfinance portfolios and organizational 
capabilities of regulated banks and MFIs. Aryeetey [1998] suggests a three-tiered approach to 
regulation and supervision of the informal sector: formal banks lend to credible, semi-formal agents 
w ho then link up w ith informal lenders; rural/small borrow ers receive loans directly from informal 
agents; and semi-formal institutions can then be the agencies responsible for the regulation of 
smaller, informal units.  
4.10  EN HAN CING TH E ABILITY O F MICRO  FIN AN CE IN STITU TIO N S (MFIs)  
TO  SERVE BO RRO W ERS 
Much has been w ritten over the last decade about the remarkable grow th of diverse types of MFIs 
across all regions of the developing w orld [e.g., Versluysen, 1999; D aley-H arris, 2005, 2002; Zeller 
and Meyer, 2002]. Although the structure and operating practices of MFIs remain heterogeneous, 
these institutions generally share a commitment to serving those social groups and small-scale 
businesses that are not served by the formal financial sector. The lending of MFIs can therefore 
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promote some degree of employment creation and poverty alleviation by providing opportunities 
for business activity by those groups (such as w omen) and to those areas of the country (especially 
rural areas) that normally face severe credit constraints.  
H ow ever, it should be obvious that MFIs are not the development panacea that many 
enthusiasts suggest. Indeed, Rahman [1999], Grosh and Somolekae [1996], and Christensen [1993] 
raise issues that complicate the generally sanguine view  of MFIs, w hile essays in Zeller and Meyer 
[2002] also offer a more nuanced empirical view  of MFIs than one generally finds in the literature.  
It is clear that MFIs cannot play a central role in promoting pro-poor grow th, nor are they an 
appropriate institutional form to resolve problems of savings mobilization or allocation on the 
macroeconomic level.  
N evertheless, MFIs are a part of the financial landscape in many developing countries, and 
they are supported by many external donors. Thus, it is reasonable to consider how  the potential  
of MFIs to contribute to savings allocation and mobilization can be enhanced by the supportive 
actions of developmental central banks and/or external actors. In w hat follow s, w e briefly survey 
the most successful efforts to provide support to MFIs.   
Central banks specifically support MFIs through credit guarantees and insurance, 
participation in their capitalization, management, and establishment of priority sector lending 
requirements, differential interest rates, preferential rediscount rates and facilities that target 
credit/deposit ratios for rural bank branches.12 External support has been crucial to the success of 
almost all MFIs. W hile central banks have generally not provided direct financial support to  
MFIs that are not licensed financial institutions, there are a number of important exceptions. In 
Bangladesh, for example, the central bank provided support to the Grameen Bank from as early 
as 1979, before it w as established as a specialized development bank in 1983. The central bank 
also supported the bank w ith lines of credit.  
Central banks may also operate as ‘second-tier’ institutions that channel funds to individual 
MFIs. In N epal, for example, the central bank administers the Rural Self-Reliance Fund, w hich 
provided w holesale funds to MFIs for lending to final borrow ers. In India, the N ational Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural D evelopment w as established by the central bank as an apex body for rural 
credit. It provides a small amount of revolving fund assistance to nonbank MFIs, w ith funding 
obtained from the Sw iss Agency for D evelopment and Cooperation.  
In Indonesia, the central bank disburses funds to the provincial government, commercial 
banks and rural banks for lending to small financial institutions and micro-entrepreneurs under a 
micro-credit project initiated w ith support from the Asian D evelopment Bank. These banks have 
been highly successful in developing appropriate products and processes for reaching micro-
entrepreneurs, though interest rates are high at around 2-4 per cent per month. Like the Grameen 
Bank, they have enjoyed repayment rates of over 95 per cent.  
The issue of appropriate regulation for MFIs cannot be ignored, and there is much research 
that needs to be done in this area. Based on experiences in Ghana and the Philippines, Gallardo 
[2001] describes a tiered regulatory structure for MFIs and has identified threshold levels of 
intermediation that trigger the need for external regulation of their activities. External regulation  
is not called for w here MFIs (and informal lenders) do not access funds beyond members’ savings. 
H ow ever, a higher standard of regulation is called for w hen MFIs access funds from external 
sources. In such cases, the standard registration procedures that apply to formal financial 
institutions (involving, for instance, filing documents regarding the establishment and the 
governance structure of the institution) should apply to all MFIs.  
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An even higher level of regulation applies to institutions engaged in financial intermediation 
that does not include retail deposit-taking activities. These institutions should be monitored 
through standard periodic reports. Even more stringent regulation should apply to all limited-
license banks and non-bank MFIs, permitting them to take deposits from the general public that 
are limited to a multiple of the institution’s total qualifying capital. Such institutions may need to 
comply w ith higher capital adequacy guidelines and restrictions on their services and operations. 
The highest level of regulation applies to licensed banks that are permitted to mobilize retail 
deposits from the general public. These institutions should be subject to full offsite and onsite 
supervision, licensing requirements and full prudential supervision by the regulatory authorities. 
5  CEN TRA L BA N KS A S A G EN TS O F PRO -PO O R G RO W TH :  
A  CO N SID ERA TIO N  O F PO LICY O PTIO N S 
As mentioned in section 4.10, central banks can play a role in supporting developmental lending by 
MFI's and other institutions serving social needs. In the last several decades, how ever, this 
‘developmental’ financial role for central banks has not been the norm. In fact, during the last 
decade, central banks in developing countries have increasingly adopted approaches to monetary 
policy that focus on low ering the rate of inflation, w ith little regard to their impact on ‘real factors’ 
such as poverty, employment, investment or economic grow th. Among these approaches, 
‘inflation targeting’ is the most prominent [Saad Filho, 2006]. At the same time, they have 
eschew ed the broad range of tools of central bank policy so w idely used by developed country and 
developing country central banks for allocating credit to social priority sectors and managing the 
international flow s of capital. Instead, most central banks now  focus on a narrow  range of 
stabilization goals, using a narrow  range of instruments, primarily short-term interest rates. 
Follow ing this strategy, central banks attempt to hit a target range for inflation w hile mostly 
ignoring the impact of monetary policy on other economic variables. By 2005, more than 19 
countries had adopted inflation targeting and more countries are considering doing so [IMF, 2005]. 
Even w here countries do not implement form al inflation targeting, many of them—under pressure 
from the IMF and other organizations—still orient policy almost exclusively to fighting inflation. In 
many countries, inflation targeting has generated significant costs—slow  grow th, sluggish 
employment generation and high real interest rates—w hile yielding, at most, minor benefits. 
Among the greatest disappointments for proponents of inflation targeting has been its apparent 
inability to reduce the so-called sacrifice ratio, the unemployment costs of fighting inflation.  
[Saad Filho, 2006].  
Inflation targeting is also typically accompanied by the absence of credit promotion and 
allocation policies by the central bank. In line w ith standard orthodox approaches, the central bank 
has eschew ed ‘developmental central banking’ in favour of focusing exclusively on ‘stabilization’ as 
the goal of economic policy. This focus on fighting inflation and achieving stabilization, to the 
exclusion of addressing other problems, is particularly puzzling in light of the w ell-know n evidence 
indicating that moderate inflation (10-15 per cent) has no negative consequences on important 
real variables [Bruno and Easterly, 1998; Zhu and Pollin, 2005].13 By contrast, the costs of large-scale 
unemployment and slow  grow th are high and w ell understood. For example, South Africa, w here 
the unemployment rate is above 40 per cent, seems singularly ill-suited for such a policy, yet the 
South African Reserve Bank is an enthusiastic supporter of inflation targeting. 
H ence, alternatives to this destructive monetary policy must be developed and promoted. 
Indeed, a central component of any macroeconomic policy aimed at tackling the ills of poverty, 
high unemployment and slow  economic grow th in developing countries must rest on a feasible 
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and efficient framew ork for conducting monetary policy oriented tow ard these goals w hile, to be 
sure, keeping inflation from escalating beyond a moderate level and holding other problems in 
check. Along these lines, central banks must play a more pro-poor developmental role. This 
developmental role has tw o components, one w ith respect to monetary policy and the other w ith 
respect to sectoral and credit allocation policies. 
Monetary Policy: W ithin a real targeting framew ork for central bank policy, central banks first 
choose a real target that is appropriate for that particular country—normally poverty levels, 
employment grow th, investment or real economic grow th—and then choose a set of monetary 
policy instruments to achieve that target. Central to this strategy is the recognition that in order  
to achieve the chosen target, there w ill normally be other economic constraints that must be 
confronted, including, most notably, inflation and balance of payments or exchange rate 
constraints [Pollin, 1998]. In this situation, the central bank w ill normally have to hit multiple  
targets and constraints. Therefore, taking into account the classic Tinbergen analysis, it w ill  
need to implement several monetary policy tools, including perhaps, some new  ones.  
Sectoral Policy: W ith respect to sectoral policies, central banks can support institutions 
facilitating the allocation of credit by the government and financial institutions for sustainable 
grow th and employment generation as w ell as the accumulation of productive assets by the poor. 
W e consider monetary and sectoral policies in sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. 
As w e w ill see below , changes in interest rates and other standard monetary tools are 
important to low ering the cost of credit and expanding aggregate demand, as w ell as helping to 
moderate inflation. Training Module #2 discusses this component in detail. H ow ever, for central 
banks to have a truly significant impact on generating employment and reducing poverty, in many 
cases they have to play a crucial developmental role and interact w ith the financial sector.  
A discussion of this ‘developmental financial role’ of central banks w ill be a key focus of our 
discussion here. 
First, w e provide a brief overview  of the overall central bank framew ork that can be conducive 
to pro-poor grow th. 
5.1  MO N ETARY PO LICY: A REAL TARGETING APPRO ACH  
This real targeting framew ork has a number of important advantages.  
1. First and foremost, it places front and centre the economic variables that have the 
most immediate and clearest association w ith social w elfare. The central bank w ill be 
forced to identify this target and then reach it, and if it fails to do so, explain w hy it 
failed and how  it w ill improve in the next period.  
2. Given the public pressure to reach this target, the central bank w ill have significant 
incentives to invest in research and other activities to improve its understanding and 
develop tools to reach this real target.  
3. Given that it w ill need to reach this target amid other constraints, it w ill need to 
develop new  tools of monetary policy. For example, if a central bank must hit an 
employment target subject to an inflation and balance of payments constraint, then— 
in addition to interest rate policy—it might explore asset allocation strategies to 
encourage banks to lend more to high employment-generating uses and capital 
control techniques to manage balance of payments problems [Pollin, 1998; Epstein, 
Grabel and Jomo, 2004]. 
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4. A real targeting approach lends itself naturally to a more democratic, transparent and 
accountable central bank policy that serves the genuine needs of the majority of 
countries’ citizens, rather than those of a minority that typically benefits from the 
combination of high real interest rates, low  inflation and slow er grow th.  
5. The framew ork is much more conducive to tailoring monetary policy to the specific 
needs of different countries. For example, if a country has a particular problem w ith 
generating good jobs for w omen or more jobs in a particular region of the country,  
the real targeting approach is better suited to target such employment objectives 
(along w ith more employment generally) and devise instruments to achieve them.  
 
In short, the real targeting approach to monetary policy is likely to be more relevant, flexible 
and effective than inflation targeting.  
5.1.1  Em ploym ent Targeting and Central Bank Policy: A n Exam ple  
An alternative targeting approach w ould target ‘real’ variables that contribute directly to the 
economic w elfare of the majority of the country’s residents. The advantage of a targeting approach 
is that it requires the central bank to identify its goals, makes transparent w hether it is reaching that 
goal, and therefore potentially increases the accountability of the central bank to the general 
public. O f course, to make accountability a reality, additional political structures must be in place  
as w ell. W e turn to this issue briefly at the end of this Module.  
W hich real variable should be targeted? This w ill obviously depend on the particular 
circumstances of the country involved. For some countries w ith a very large unemployment or 
underemployment problem, such as South Africa, em ploym ent targeting is a good candidate. In 
other cases, investment grow th or real GD P grow th w ould be more appropriate. U nlike the claims 
made by proponents of inflation targeting, the real targeting approach recognizes that one size 
does not necessarily fit all. Still, employment targeting is a good example because creating gainful 
employment must be a crucial element in pro-poor financial policy. 
In this section w e have elaborated on one example, namely, an em ploym ent targeting 
approach to monetary policy. O ther examples, such as investment or real GD P targeting, w ould 
share many of the components described here.  
5.1.2  Em ploym ent Targeting  
W ith employment targeting, central banks w ould choose, or be given by the democratic 
authorities, an employment, employment grow th or unemployment rate target. The central bank 
w ould be required to devise means (i.e., instruments) for achieving that target. If it failed to achieve 
the target during the allotted period, it w ould be required to explain w hy the target w as not 
achieved, as w ell as to develop mechanisms for achieving the employment target in the next 
period. Implemented in this w ay, targeting contributes to central bank transparency and 
accountability, thus taking an important leaf from the ‘inflation targeting’ book.  
As mentioned earlier, the evidence indicates that if inflation reaches high enough levels, it can 
create significant economic and social costs. H ence, no central bank can entirely ignore inflation.  
In the employment targeting approach, therefore, the central bank must achieve its employment 
target subject to an inflation constraint. W hat the inflation constraint is should depend on the 
particular circumstances of the country involved. W hatever the level, as long as the constraint is 
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binding or could be binding in a given period, it means that the central bank w ill essentially have 
tw o targets—employment and inflation. And as Jan Tinbergen famously put it, policy makers need 
as many independent instruments as they have independent targets.  
Central banks used to have many tools of monetary policy (of w hich w e w ill speak more 
below ). H ow ever, w ith the rise of neo-liberalism, including financial liberalization and the 
elimination of capital controls in many countries, most central banks have dramatically reduced the 
number of independent monetary tools they use, often to only one, namely, a short-term interest 
rate. This tool alone w ill not generally be sufficient to both reach an employment target and satisfy 
an inflation constraint. H ence, the central bank w ill have to develop new  tools (or dust off old ones) 
in order to implement this policy. H ow ever, the need for the central bank to learn and innovate w ill 
most likely go far beyond this level for a simple yet profound reason: most central banks know  very 
little about how  to generate employment.  
The reasons for this need are many, but the most important is quite simple: for many years 
now , most central banks have not had to w orry about generating employment because they have 
been pressured to be concerned only about inflation (or the exchange rate). As a result, central 
banks (and associated economic researchers the w orld over) have devoted millions of dollars and 
countless hours to economic analysis and modelling to figure out the relationship betw een 
monetary policy and inflation, w hile spending virtually nothing on discovering the relationship 
betw een monetary policy and employment generation. H ence, not only w ill the central bank have 
to develop new  instruments because it has more targets than instruments; but it w ill also have to 
develop new  instruments because the target is ‘new ’ and unfamiliar.  
Research economists at the central bank w ill need to start conducting research on how  to  
use monetary tools to generate more employment; they w ill have to consult w ith business, labour, 
organizations from the ‘informal economy’, maybe even NGO s (to say nothing of the labour 
ministries in their ow n government), to try to develop approaches to generating more employment. 
This re-orientation in research, and even a change in the culture of the central bank, could be  
one of the most important and long-lasting results of the re-definition of the central bank target.  
As central banks learn more about how  to use monetary policy to increase employment, and 
as they develop new  tools to reach this target subject to an inflation constraint, they might 
discover that they are re-inventing tools that w ere part of the standard central bank tool kit in the 
developing w orld in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s: credit allocation policies; the provision of support 
to development banks; and regulations in support of development lending (see below ). For the 
most part, policies such as these that w ere largely eliminated in the 1990s—sometimes for good 
reason, sometimes not—w ill be re-discovered, modernized and improved upon.  
5.1.3  Com plem entary Institutions and A dditional Considerations  
Because a more expansionary monetary policy m ight lead to other constraints, a central bank 
oriented tow ards increasing employment is likely to require complementary policies to be 
successful. These problems might include excessive inflation and capital flight. In addition, further 
structural changes w ould likely be necessary to make central bank policy truly accountable.  
Inflation: The monetarist view  that inflation is alw ays and everyw here a monetary 
phenomenon is false [Saad Filho, 2006]. More generally, excessive inflation is not likely to be a 
prominent problem resulting from an employment targeting approach, as long as other economic 
policies of the government, including fiscal policy, are responsible and as long as the economy is 
not subject to excessive external shocks. H ow ever, excessive inflation may rear its ugly head on 
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occasion and economic policy must be prepared to deal w ith it. W e have already discussed 
monetary policy tools to limit inflation. As the central bank develops new  tools to enhance 
employment grow th, it can, if necessary, use traditional monetary policy tools such as short-term 
interest rates, to satisfy its inflation constraint. In some cases, w hen using interest rates to fight 
inflation w ithout interfering w ith the employment grow th target may not be feasible, the central 
bank may need to consider other options, such as temporary incomes policies. The combination of 
policies required w ill vary depending on the country and the situation.  
Capital flight: Foreign and domestic investors might speculate against the central bank 
policy, leading to capital flight, or more often, dow nw ard pressure on exchange rates and foreign 
exchange reserves. Capital management techniques, such as capital controls, might be necessary 
to insulate the economy from such speculative flow s. As Epstein, Grabel and Jomo [2004] show , 
countries successfully use a variety of such techniques to manage their economies. (See section 6 
for a discussion of these policies). 
5.1.4  Possible O bjections  
Some w ill raise objections to the employment targeting approach specifically or to the real 
targeting approach more generally. The most common objection likely to come from mainstream 
economists is that monetary policy is incapable of affecting real variables, at least in the ‘long run’. 
To adequately address this objection w ould require a separate paper, but w e w ould like to mention 
a few  key points on the theoretical and empirical side. O n the theoretical side, the notion that 
monetary policy cannot affect real variables is based on an incoherent W alrasian macroeconomic 
model, common to orthodox macroeconomics, w hich assumes aw ay problems of uncertainty  
and unemployment. In Marxian, Keynesian, Kaleckian, Post-Keynesian and even N ew -Keynesian 
approaches, there are strong reasons to believe that monetary policy can have long-term, real 
effects. O n the empirical side, a vast literature supplies strong evidence that monetary  
policy has real effects. 
Additionally, some w ill argue that developmentalist central banks could be captured by 
‘special interests’ leading to ‘corruption’ and ‘rent seeking’. W hile it is true that any government 
institution that can allocate resources may implement corrupt policies, this is not a unique attribute 
of state-based policies. Private corporations can also be purveyors of corrupt practices, as the 
multiple cases of massive fraud in Enron and many other companies have demonstrated. The 
challenge of dealing w ith corruption involves creating monitoring, transparency and accountability 
mechanisms applicable to all institutions. These are mechanisms as applicable to private 
corporations and the market as to the state.  
5.2  SECTO RAL PO LICIES U SED  BY D EVELO PMEN TAL CEN TRAL BAN KS 
Monetary policy has typically been only one component of central bank policy. U sing central banks 
to promote sectoral and industrial development, as w ell as to achieve government goals to raise 
the incomes and w ealth of sectors of society, has also been important in the history of central 
banking. Such policies and institutional attributes of central banks have often been termed the 
‘developmental’ role of central banks [Epstein, 2006; Asian D evelopment Bank, 2000]. Although  
this developmental role has now  fallen out of favour in policy circles, it has not only been very 
important historically, but also continues to be used to good effect in some countries  
[AD B, 2000; Epstein, 2006; Stallings and Studart, 2006].  
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This developmental role is a key component of monetary policy used for pro-poor grow th. 
Moreover, since the major mechanism by w hich central banks have engaged in this policy is 
through their regulation of and interaction w ith the financial sector, this topic is central to our 
discussion of financial policies, even though it is located falls at the intersection betw een financial 
policy and central bank policy. 
H istorically, the role of central banks as agents of pro-poor development policy has varied 
from country to country. U sing country examples from Amsden [2001], one can see that in India 
and China, for example, central banks played a crucial role as part of the planning apparatus and 
w ere key players in the allocation of medium- and long-term credit to industrial sectors. In Mexico 
and Thailand, their role w as less important. In Brazil and Republic of Korea, the role of central banks 
occupies a middle ground betw een those of the other tw o groups. In short, w hile not all 
developing-country central banks have played a developmental role, in many they have done so 
quite successfully. 
5.2.1  India and China14 
Mr. P.C. Bhattacharyya, a former governor of the Reserve Bank of India (1962-1967), describes the 
role of central banking in India in the 1960s:  
“India has consciously chosen a policy of planned economic development…   The traditional objective of a 
central bank is the maintenance of price and exchange stability. H ow ever, this is but a means to achieve 
economic progress rather than an end in itself. In the context of the developing countries, these 
objectives…   have to be fitted into the broader and more compelling urge for furthering economic 
grow th…   A country must have an appropriate degree of monetary expansion to meet the increasing 
requirements of a grow ing economy…   The aim of a central bank in a developing country has, therefore,  
to be the adoption of adequate policies w hich aim at bringing about an appropriate degree of monetary 
expansion along w ith price and exchange stability…   Further, monetary policy in such a country has also  
to provide for mobilization of resources to the maximum possible extent, as w ell as provide for the most 
efficient investment of the same for purposes of development.” [Bhattacharyya, 1971, pp. 1-2]. 
 
This monetary manifesto provides a stark contrast w ith that of the orthodox central bank, but 
does not seem that far different from the post-w ar practices of France, Belgium, Italy and Japan. 
(See Box 1). 
Bhattacharyya emphasizes that monetary policy is only one part of economic policy and that, 
as a result, the central bank cannot be an entity unto itself and independent from the government 
[p. 15], a statement from a central banker that w ould shock today’s promoters of the orthodox 
recipe. Bhattacharyya further notes that direct instruments of monetary control have an important 
place in the tool kit of monetary policy: they can protect important sectors from credit tightening 
and allow  for more direct monitoring of credit use [ibid., p. 14]. This is a view  of monetary policy 
that is similar to those taken by French and Japanese central bankers. 
As in the case of post-w ar European countries, India deployed a broad set of capital and 
exchange controls, and initially, controls over current account transactions as w ell. These 
complemented the mobilization and credit allocation techniques employed by the Reserve Bank 
and associated institutions. Bhattacharyya further notes that price and exchange rate stability 
cannot be ignored, but are part of the fundamental development process [ibid., p. 15].  
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Since the 1970s, India has been engaged in a process of financial liberalization. There have 
been several reforms of the banking and financial sectors, liberalization of interest rates and 
exchange controls and external financial liberalization as w ell. W hile elements of the old regime 
still exist, the context w ithin w hich they operate has been radically altered [Saez, 2004]. The  
recent increase in economic grow th in India has led some observers to hold liberalization and 
globalization to be responsible. O bservers w ho agree w ith Amsden w ould suggest that it w as 
during the post-w ar years of planning and credit mobilization and allocation, of w hich the Reserve 
Bank of India w as a key part, that the foundation for recent grow th w as laid. 
BO X 1 
India 
At the time of independence, India faced serious gaps in institutional structures for the mobilization of savings 
and investment. The banking system w as mostly urban and short-term oriented, providing mostly w orking capital 
of a short-term nature [ibid., p. 3]. The stock market w as the mechanism for raising long-term capital, but, like 
most stock markets, rationed out new  firms. Thus, “it w as only natural that the Reserve Bank of India…   turned its 
attention at the very outset, to the development of various types of new  institutional facilities to fill in the gaps. 
This became one of its main roles in pursuance of the broader objective of the promotional aspect of central 
banking policy” [ibid., p. 3]. The Reserve Bank established agricultural co-operative banks to help raise funds and 
provide technical assistance; in the industrial field, the Reserve Bank contributed to setting up the Industrial 
Finance Corporation of India, w hich w as intended to supply the long-term capital needs of industry; the Reserve 
Bank also contributed substantially to the capital structures of various State Finance Corporations, w hich w ere 
supposed to support the financial needs of the small industrial sector. In 1964, it also set up the Industrial 
D evelopment Bank of India as a w holly-ow ned subsidiary of the Reserve Bank to “function at the apex of an 
integrated structure of industrial finance as w ell as to provide resources for large-sized projects of industrial 
development… ” [ibid., p. 5]. The Reserve Bank also promoted branch banking to mobilize savings and developed 
a system of industrial subsidies and preferences for targeted industries [ibid, pp. 6-8]. 
 
In China, until recently, the central bank w as entirely subsumed into the state planning 
apparatus. The banking industry has been entirely state-ow ned since the revolution and is highly 
concentrated. The Chinese economy has been characterized by exchange and capital controls, as 
w ell as strong controls over interest rates and financial markets [Saez, 2004; Epstein et. al., 2005a]. 
Since the late 1970s, how ever, the system has been undergoing steady reforms along w ith the 
increased role of markets, private investment and foreign investment in the Chinese economy. 
(See Box 2). 
Maintaining a low  value of the exchange rate has been a crucial component of China’s 
development strategy and, in turn, capital and exchange controls have been a crucial component 
of that strategy. More recently, as interest rates, financial markets and capital controls have become 
more liberalized, the People’s Bank of China has begun to take on more traditional macroeconomic 
roles typical of ‘modern’ central banks. Still, it relies heavily on credit controls to conduct monetary 
policy, as it attempts to keep the Renminbi at an undervalued level for purposes of export 
promotion. The central bank’s management of these exchange controls has been amongst its most 
important developmental contributions in the last several decades. 
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BO X 2 
China 
From 1949 until the late 1970s, China w as dominated by one bank: the People’s Bank of China (PBO C). It role w as 
to help mobilize and allocate savings in accordance w ith the state plan. In the late 1970s the government started 
to reform the banking system. By the early 1980s the PBO C had been separated from the Ministry of Finance and 
its monopoly position had been ended. Eventually, four major commercial banks w ere created, all state-ow ned. 
Today, competing w ith the four state banks is a second tier of state-ow ned commercial banks. A third tier includes 
shareholding smaller regional banks, many of w hich w ere established as part of the special economic zones that 
led the economic reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, since 1994, there have been three policy 
banks: the State D evelopment Bank, the Export Import Bank and the Agriculture D evelopment Bank. These banks 
handle policy-related lending associated w ith government plans. In addition to these banks, China has a series  
of urban and rural cooperative banks [Saez, ch. 15]. Finally, there is a series of non-bank financial institutions, 
including insurance agencies, credit unions and savings and loan associations. The presence of private and foreign 
banking in China is still marginal [Saez, p. 31]. 
O ne of the salient features of Chinese banking has been its close association w ith state-ow ned enterprises 
(SO Es). This has now  become a source of significant banking problems due to the large number of non-performing 
loans connected w ith these SO Es. Among the major issues facing the financial sector is the management of these 
non-performing loans and the reform of the SO Es. The interpretation of these loans and the role of SO Es in China’s 
development are highly contested. O n the one hand, some argue that these loans indicate large-scale w aste, 
inefficiency and corruption. Li argues, on the other hand, that the SO Es have been much more efficient than is 
generally realized and have played a significant role in China’s industrial development and helped to stabilize 
aggregate demand. Given China’s phenomenal industrial success and the large role of SO Es in the Chinese 
economy, it w ould be hard to make a case that they have played no role in China’s stunning development. 
The Chinese Central Bank w as created out of the People’s Bank of China (PBO C) in 1983. The PBO C a 
cted primarily as an agent of the government’s plan and did not exert a significant independent effect on 
policy. Consequently, the Central Bank is best seen as a supporter of the overall plan and of the credit 
allocation accompanying China’s post-w ar grow th, taking into account the strengths as w ell as the 
w eaknesses of those developments. 
5.2.2  The Republic of Korea and Brazil15 
Republic of Korea and Brazil both had central banks that w ere tied to the requirements of 
government and the requirements of industry. (See Boxes 3 and 4). 
BO X 3 
Republic of Korea 
As w e saw  in our discussion of Amsden’s w ork, crucial to Republic of Korea’s post-w ar success as one of the “rest” 
w as a strong planning and control mechanism combined w ith institutions for channelling long-term resources to 
targeted infrastructure and productive industrial uses. As part of this mechanism, the Government retained strong 
control over the financial system, particularly in the period 1961-1979 [N embhard, 1996, p. 90]. As one economist 
put it, “except in times of w ar, only a few  nations have used policies of selective credit control as w idely and 
thoroughly as has Korea.” [quoted in N embhard, p. 91]. The Government used the banking system to channel 
credit by setting low  interest rates on loans to targeted borrow ers and by directing loans to particular enterprises. 
Amsden emphasized that monitoring and performance requirements w ere associated w ith these loans.  
 
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The government used ‘policy loans’ to direct lending for preferred purposes. Lending rates and lending conditions 
w ere strictly controlled according to the type of preferential fund. This allow ed the Government to effectively 
ration credit for certain purposes and ensure a plentiful supply for others. 
W hat w as the role of the central bank in Korea’s development miracle? The Minister of Finance supervised and 
regulated all the activities of the banking system, including those of the central bank (the Bank of Korea). As in France 
and China, the Republic of Korea’s central bank w as subservient to these planning institutions and performed its 
assigned roles, w hich evolved over time. Although the central bank w as established w ith some degree of 
independence under the guidance of tw o experts from the N ew  York Federal Reserve in the 1950s, it w as soon 
placed under the de facto control of the Ministry of Finance, until this subservience w as formally enshrined in 
legislation in 1962 [Maxfield, 1997, p. 113]. At that time, the pow ers of the Bank w ere distributed amongst a number 
of entities, w hile the Bank of Korea itself w as left only w ith credit policy. “This left a central bank that over the next 
several decades did little more than implement credit policies in line w ith policies designed by the Economic 
Planning Board and the Ministry of Finance. In fact, the bank w as commonly called the ‘N amdaemun branch of the 
finance Ministry’ referring to the Seoul district in w hich the bank is located.” [Maxw ell, 1997, p. 113] O ver the 
follow ing tw o decades, the central bank remained politically w eak. The Bank oversaw  the commercial banks’ 
implementation of credit distribution plans draw n up by the Economic Planning Board in accordance w ith overall 
industrialization goals. Since government controls also limited the development of the financial sector, a strong 
financial constituency did not develop to oppose the credit market policies [ibid, p. 115]. Complementing the control 
over the financial sector w as an extensive set of exchange and capital controls [N embard, pp. 85-92.]. These controls 
allow ed the Korean government to keep interest rates low  w hen they so chose and to allocate credit to desired 
purposes w ithout much spillage overseas. They also helped to prevent macro-level financial instability arising from 
unstable inflow s and outflow s of capital or from excessive short-term borrow ing. 
 
Similar to other countries, in the 1990s, the Republic of Korea liberalized its financial system, 
eventually leading to the crisis of the late 1990s. Since that time, the Bank of Korea has been far 
more preoccupied w ith overall macroeconomic policy, and has had few er tools and less of a 
mandate to act as an agent of development. 
Brazil presents an interesting contrast w ith the Republic of Korea. As in Korea, Brazil's central 
bank w as part of a developmental apparatus directed at promoting grow th and development. 
H ow ever, because of insufficient planning coherence, use of the financial apparatus w as not as 
successful as in the Republic of Korea. (See Box 4). 
BO X 4 
Brazil 
Like many European central banks, the Brazilian Central Bank started off as a private bank, the Banco do Brasil, 
w hich in the early 1900s financed coffee grow ers and industrialists [Maxfield, p. 123]. Then, in the 1920s, the Banco 
do Brasil became a quasi central bank, but continued its policies of supporting these same sectors. British creditors 
preferred to have a ‘real’ central bank that w as not so tied to domestic borrow ers, but the political pow er of the 
coffee grow ers and industrialists prevented the creation of a central bank to the creditors liking. A half-w ay 
institution, the Superintendency of Money and Credit (SUMO C) w as created in 1945 to manage foreign exchange 
and credit. H ow ever, the Banco do Brasil continued to formulate exchange rate and credit policy. It w as also the 
recipient of legal mandatory reserves by commercial banks, though it w as exempted from having to hold them 
itself. H ence, it w as privileged, as w ere previous central banks in their early years, despite being profit-oriented.  
 
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Although the political battles over the creation of a full, public central bank continued, a central bank w as not 
formally created until the military coup of 1964. As soon as it w as created, how ever, its independent authority w as 
undermined and it w as brought under the close authority of the central government [Maxfield, p. 136]. 
In this context, the Brazilian central bank has been tasked w ith implementing central government policy. 
This policy itself has varied over time. W hen the Government w as focused on reducing inflation (1965-1967), it 
pursued more liberal and outw ard-oriented policies. W hen the Government w anted to encourage rapid 
industrialization (1950s, 1967-74, 1985-87), more inw ard-oriented policies w ere pursued and the central bank 
contributed in classic fashion, helping to direct finances and granting favoured treatment to local industries, w hile 
implementing strict controls on inflow s and outflow s of capital [N embhard, p. 145].  
Yet, the implementation of these policies w as not nearly as effective as in the case of the Republic of 
Korea. There w ere many factors at play. Among the most relevant for our purposes w as the highly decentralized 
nature of the country’s financial system, w hich made it difficult for the central bank and related institutions to 
monitor and control the allocation of credit. Thus, w hile the central bank, under the direction of the 
Government, tried to act as an agent of development, the relative lack of a coherent planning process and the 
difficulty of dealing w ith a more dispersed financial system led to its being less successful in industrial policy 
than the Republic of Korea [N embard, ch. 5]. 
 
5.2.3  Thailand and M exico 
The cases of Thailand and Mexico present an interesting contrast w ith China, India, the Republic of 
Korea and Brazil [Maxfield, 1994; 1997]. In these cases, relatively strong and independent private 
financial systems, along w ith a stronger need to borrow  from foreign creditors, led both domestic 
and foreign creditors to support the creation of relatively independent central banks [Maxfield, 
1994] (See Box 5).  
BO X 5 
Thailand and M exico 
In Thailand and Mexico, the central banks w ere much less closely tied to the financing industry and the 
Governments than in China and India or Brazil and the Republic of Korea. And w hile their positions changed over 
time depending on both domestic and political factors, overall, these central banks played a larger role in 
attracting credit from abroad and supporting the domestic financial sectors than they did in promoting 
industrialization. In the 1990s, for example, in a move reminiscent of the roles of the Federal Reserve and the Bank 
of England, the central bank and Government of Thailand supported efforts to make Bangkok into a regional 
financial centre as part of a development plan [Ghosh and Chandrasekhar, 2001]. W ith the crash of 1997, the result 
w as not a happy one, how ever. 
Arguably, then, these central banks w ere more oriented to finance and to international creditors than to 
domestic industrial development. H ence, they acted less as agents of development than the central banks in the 
other countries. 
 
In short, as the cases of Mexico and Thailand show , not all developing countries have had 
strong, development-oriented central banks. W here central banks w ere too closely tied to finance 
and not closely enough tied to industry, they did not play the developmental role that many other 
such banks played. The Thai and Mexican cases both indicate that not all developing countries 
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have had developmental central banks that used the financial sector for developmental purposes. 
They also plausibly suggest that countries that have not had developmental central banks have 
paid a developmental price. 
5.3  IMPLICATIO N S 
The mobilization, allocation and monitoring of medium- and long-term credit w ere crucial to the 
success of the new ly industrialized economies in the post-w ar period. H ow ever, the role of central 
banking in supporting these policies varied from country to country, as a function of an array of 
complex factors, including inherited financial and industrial structures, the need for international 
finance, and various idiosyncratic factors that affected the politics of central banking. The w ealth of 
case studies show s that developmental central banks are not empirically anomalous. In some 
countries, such as China, India and Republic of Korea, conditions w ere ripe for central banks to play 
a key role as agents of development. In others, such as Brazil, the central bank played its role, but 
the overall structure w as highly imperfect. In others, such as Thailand and Mexico, the central bank 
w as not as firmly a part of the planning apparatus and tended to be more oriented to the needs of 
the domestic and international financial interests than to those of the government or industry.  
In all cases w here central banks played a crucial role, their connections w ith the state and w ith 
credit allocation, coupled w ith their use of capital and exchange controls to manage the 
international sector, w ere absolutely critical to their success. This approach hardly follow s the 
recipe of an independent central bank of the sort envisioned by orthodox economists. 
6  TH E EXTERN A L FIN A N CIA L SECTO R A N D  PRO -PO O R G RO W TH :  
A  CO N SID ERA TIO N  O F PO LICY O PTIO N S 
There is evidence from a variety of countries that w ell-designed policies to manage international 
private capital flow s have played important roles during crucial periods in the development 
process. W e term such policies ‘capital management techniques,’ follow ing Epstein et al. [2004]. 
Capital management techniques include (but are not limited to) measures that manage the 
volume, composition or allocation of capital flow s and/or the maintenance of restrictions on 
investor entrance and exit opportunities.  
N early all developed countries utilized capital management techniques successfully over 
long periods. For example, continental European countries employed extensive capital 
management techniques during the economic reconstruction that follow ed W orld W ar II. Even 
the U .S.A.—arguably the home of free capital flow s, and also a country w here the financial 
system has benefited substantially from the receipt of flight capital from around the w orld—
employed temporary capital management policies in 1963 because they w ere w arranted by 
economic circumstances.  
Capital management techniques played critically important roles during the high-grow th 
eras of Japan and Republic of Korea and w ere successfully employed in Brazil in the 1950s and 
1960s (e.g., N embhard, 1996). Chile and Colombia successfully used capital management 
techniques during the 1990s. The Malaysian government successfully employed stringent capital 
management policies in 1994 and 1998. India, Singapore, China and Taiw an PO C employed 
diverse strategies that could be termed (even if not by the Government itself) capital 
management techniques during the 1990s.  
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W e argue that this is a propitious moment for advocates of pro-poor grow th strategies to 
consider the role that capital management techniques can play in supporting pro-poor grow th 
strategies. As w e w ill see, some types of capital management techniques have a proven track record, 
not just in the decades that follow ed W orld W ar II, but in the current environment as w ell. This latter 
fact is increasingly recognized today, even by many prominent economists and the IMF [e.g., Prasad 
et al., 2003] w ho have recently w ritten rather positively—though nevertheless cautiously—about the 
role of certain types of market-based, temporary capital management techniques.  
Another reason that this is a propitious moment for advocates of pro-poor grow th to consider 
capital management techniques is that the problems associated w ith unfettered international 
private capital flow s have become quite obvious, particularly in light of the financial crises in the 
developing w orld during the 1990s. And finally it must be said that a pro-poor grow th agenda 
simply cannot succeed in the absence of some type of management of international capital 
movements. Capital management techniques are not an end in themselves. Rather they are a 
critical supporting player in a broader financial landscape in w hich the domestic financial system 
mobilizes and channels domestic savings w ith the support of a developmentalist central bank.   
At this point, it is important to recall the three general points that w e made in connection w ith 
our discussion of policies tow ard the domestic financial sector (see section 4 of this module). O ur 
earlier comment on nationally-specific policies is relevant to this discussion of international capital 
flow s insofar as policies designed to manage certain types of international private capital flow s are 
relevant to some countries, and not to others. W e know  that for many developing countries, the 
question of how  to manage excessive Portfolio Investment (PI) and FD I inflow s is merely theoretical 
because they attract little to none of these flow s in the first place. For some developing countries, 
private remittances are extremely important as a source of external finance, w hereas for others this 
is not the case.  
W ith regard to our earlier discussion of dynamic financial policies, it is w orth mentioning here 
Grabel’s [2004] proposal that developing countries implement a system of dynamic, narrow ly 
targeted and transparent capital management techniques that policymakers activate gradually 
once particular types of financial vulnerabilities are identified. There are certainly circumstances 
under w hich more-or-less static capital management techniques are appropriate. H ow ever, there 
are other national environments in w hich dynamic capital management techniques can be useful 
and feasible. In such environments, capital management techniques are activated w henever 
information about the economy indicates that such policies are necessary to prevent nascent 
macroeconomic fragilities from culminating in serious difficulties or even in a crisis.  
There are tw o tools envisioned in this approach—‘trip w ires’ and ‘speed bumps’. Trip w ires are 
simple measures that w arn policymakers and investors that a country is approaching high levels of 
risk in various domains (e.g., currency collapse, the flight of foreign lenders or investors, and the 
emergence of fragile financing strategies). O nce a trip w ire predicts the emergence of a particular 
vulnerability, policymakers w ould then immediately take steps to curtail this risk by activating a 
targeted, graduated capital management technique, termed a speed bump. D eveloping countries 
at different levels of w ealth require distinct trip-w ire thresholds. Trip w ires w ould have to be 
appropriately sensitive to subtle changes in the risk environment and adjustable. Sensitive trip 
w ires w ould allow  policymakers to activate graduated speed bumps w ell before conditions for 
investor panic had materialized. (See sections 6.1-6.2 of this module for specific examples).  
W e divide our discussion of policy options tow ard private international capital flow s into 
several sections—policies tow ard foreign bank borrow ing (section 6.1), portfolio investment 
(section 6.2), FD I (section 6.3) and private remittances (section 6.4).16 O ur discussion of these 
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diverse types of private international capital flow s is motivated by the view  that appropriate capital 
management techniques can increase the likelihood that different types of international capital 
flow s support—and certainly do not disrupt—a pro-poor grow th agenda. The attraction of any 
type of private international capital flow s, w ithout discrimination, should not be seen as a panacea 
by policymakers (and accordingly, w e do not describe policies to attract private international 
capital flow s). Rather, the question is how  appropriate capital management techniques can 
maximize the developmental potential of these flow s. Section 6.5 presents a brief discussion of the 
complementarity betw een efforts to manage the exchange rate and international private capital 
flow s. A thorough treatment of strategies tow ard the exchange rate is, of course, outside the scope 
of this module.  
Tables 5 and 6 summarize many of the key aspects and impacts of the capital management 
techniques employed by a range of developing countries during the 1990s [from Epstein, Grabel 
and Jomo, 2004]. These tables complement the discussion below  by giving quite specific and 
concrete country experiences to illustrate the general points about capital management 
techniques in the analysis that follow s. 
TABLE 5 
Experiences w ith Capital M anagem ent Techniques in the 1990s* 
Country Types of Capital  
Management Techniques 
Objectives of Capital  
Management Techniques 
Chile Inflows 
Inflow management 
FDI and PI: one year residence requirement  
30 per cent URR 
Borrowing Restrictions: 
Tax on foreign loans: 1.2 per cent per year 
Outflows 
- no restrictions 
Domestic Financial Regulations 
- strong regulatory measures 
- lengthen maturity structures and stabilize 
inflows 
- help manage exchange rates to maintain 
export competitiveness 
- protect economy from financial instability 
Colombia Similar to Chile Similar to Chile 
Taiwan POC Inflows 
non-residents 
- bank accounts can only be used for domestic 
spending, not financial speculation 
- foreign participation in stock market regulated 
- FDI tightly regulated  
residents 
- regulation of foreign borrowing 
Outflows 
- exchange controls 
Domestic Financial Regulations 
- restrictions on lending for real estate and other 
speculative purposes 
- promote industrialization 
- help manage exchange rate for export 
competitiveness 
- maintain financial stability and insulate 
from foreign financial crises 
Singapore Inflows 
‘Non-Internationalization’ of Singapore $ 
Outflows 
non-residents 
- financial institutions cannot extend S$ credit to 
non-residents if they are likely to use it for 
speculation 
- to prevent speculation against  
Singapore $ 
- to support ‘soft peg’ of S$ 
- to help maintain export competitiveness 
- to help insulate Singapore from foreign 
financial crises 
 
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- if non-residents borrow for use abroad, must 
first swap into foreign currency 
Domestic Financial Regulations 
- restrictions on creation of swaps and other 
derivatives that could be used for speculation 
against S$ 
Malaysia Inflows 
- restrictions on foreign borrowing 
Outflows 
non-residents 
- 12-month repatriation waiting period 
- graduated exit levies inversely proportional to 
length of stay  
residents 
- exchange controls 
Domestic Financial Regulations 
non-residents 
- restrict access to ringit  
residents 
- encourage to borrow domestically and invest 
- to maintain political and  
economic sovereignty 
- kill the offshore ringit market 
- shut down offshore share market 
- to help reflate the economy 
- to help create financial stability and 
insulate the economy from contagion 
India Inflows 
non-residents 
- strict regulation of FDI and PI 
Outflows 
non-residents 
- none  
residents 
- exchange controls 
Domestic Financial Regulations 
- strict limitations on development of domestic 
financial markets 
- support industrial policy 
- pursue capital account liberalization in an 
incremental and controlled fashion 
- insulate domestic economy from financial 
contagion 
- preserve domestic savings and  
forex reserves 
- help stabilize exchange rate 
China Inflows 
non-residents 
- strict regulation on sectoral FDI investment 
- regulation of equity investments: segmented 
stock market 
Outflows 
non-residents 
- no restrictions on repatriation of funds 
- strict limitations on borrowing Chinese 
Renminbi for speculative purposes  
residents 
- exchange controls 
Domestic Financial Regulations 
- strict limitations on residents and non-residents 
- support industrial policy 
- pursue capital account liberalization in 
incremental and controlled fashion 
- insulate domestic economy from  
financial contagion 
- increase political sovereignty 
- preserve domestic savings and foreign 
exchange reserves 
- help keep exchange rates at  
competitive levels 
Source: Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2004. 
*This description applies to the experience during the 1990s and not necessarily during the current period.  
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TABLE 6 
Effects of Capital M anagem ent Techniques in Seven Cases 
Country Achievements Supporting Factors Costs 
Chile - altered composition and maturity of 
inflows 
- reduced vulnerability to contagion 
- well designed policies 
- offered foreign investors 
good returns 
- state capacity 
- flexible application 
- higher cost of capital for 
small firms 
Colombia - similar to Chile but less successful - less state capacity than 
Chile 
- less flexible 
 
Taiwan POC - kept debt load manageable  
- helped keep competitive  
exchange rate 
- insulated from financial crises 
- helped maintain economic 
sovereignty 
  
Singapore - insulated from disruptive speculation 
- helped manage soft peg 
- contributed to financial strength 
- strong state capacity 
- strong economic 
fundamentals 
- possibly contributed to 
a less developed 
financial sector 
Malaysia - facilitated macroeconomic reflation 
- helped to maintain domestic 
economic sovereignty 
- public support for policies - possible cronyism/ 
corruption 
India - facilitated incremental liberalization 
- insulated from financial contagion 
- helped preserve domestic saving 
- helped maintain economic 
sovereignty 
- strong state and 
bureaucratic capacity 
- strong public support 
- restricted the 
development of the 
domestic financial 
sector 
China - facilitated industrial policy 
- insulated economy from financial 
contagion 
- helped preserve savings 
- helped manage exchange rate and 
facilitate export led growth 
- helped maintain expansionary  
macro-policy 
- helped maintain economic 
sovereignty 
- strong state and 
bureaucratic capacity 
- strong economic 
fundamentals 
- constrained the 
development of the 
financial sector 
- facilitated corruption 
Source: Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2004. 
6.1  PO LICIES TO W ARD  FO REIGN  BO RRO W ING 
It is critical that developing countries drastically reduce their reliance on foreign bank loans since 
repayment pressures have strangled economic grow th and seriously harmed the poor in many 
countries. It w ould therefore be of significant benefit if policymakers enforced strict ceilings on the 
volume of new  foreign loans that can be incurred. Such ceilings might involve strict limits on the 
allow able ratio of foreign to total loans, or might require that firms finance only a specified 
percentage of their projects w ith foreign loans that have a certain maturity and/or locational profile. 
Restrictions on foreign lending could be deployed dynamically as circumstances w arrant, 
follow ing the trip w ire-speed bump approach. U nder this approach, policymakers w ould monitor a 
trip w ire that measured the economy’s vulnerability to the cessation of foreign lending. This involves 
calculating the ratio of the government’s holdings of currency reserves to private and public foreign-
currency denominated debt (w ith short-term obligations receiving a greater w eight in the 
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calculation). If this ratio approached an announced threshold, policymakers w ould then activate a 
graduated speed bump that precluded new  inflow s of foreign loans until circumstances improved.  
Policy can also discourage—rather than prohibit—the use of foreign loans as a source of 
finance. The tax system can be used in a number of w ays to discourage domestic borrow ers from 
incurring foreign debt obligations. D omestic borrow ers might pay a fee to the Government or the 
central bank equal to a certain percentage of any foreign loan undertaken. This surcharge might 
vary based on the structure of the loan, such that loans involving a locational or maturity mismatch 
w ould incur a higher surcharge.17  Alternatively, the surcharge might vary based on the level of 
indebtedness of the particular borrow er involved, such that borrow ers w ho already held large 
foreign debt obligations w ould face higher surcharges than did less-indebted borrow ers.  
This tax-based approach could encourage borrow ers to use domestic sources of finance since 
these w ould not carry any surcharge. Another strategy might involve varying the surcharge 
according to the type of activity that w as being financed by foreign loans. For instance, borrow ers 
might be eligible for a partial rebate on foreign loan surcharges w hen loans w ere used to finance 
types of production that w ere highly employment intensive.   
N ote that policymakers in Chile and Colombia employed tax-based policies to discourage 
foreign borrow ing during much of the 1990s. In Chile, foreign loans faced a tax of 1.2 per cent per 
year (payable by the borrow er). Chilean policymakers also imposed a non-interest bearing reserve 
requirement of 30 per cent on all types of foreign debts (and indeed, on all foreign financial 
investments in the country). This policy, termed the reserve requirement tax, w as in place from May 
1992 to O ctober 1998. The required reserves held against foreign obligations (and payable by the 
borrow er) w ere kept at the Central Bank for one year, regardless of the maturity of the obligation.  
Authorities in Colombia also employed a reserve requirement tax specifically designed to 
discourage domestic borrow ers from incurring foreign loans. Beginning in September 1993, 
Colombian policymakers required that non-interest bearing reserves of 47 per cent be held for one 
year against foreign loans w ith maturities of 18 months or less (this w as extended to loans w ith a 
maturity of up to five years in August 1994).18 In addition, foreign borrow ing related to real estate 
transactions w as prohibited. Empirical studies of Chilean and Colombian policies conclude that 
they achieved their principal objectives, including the reduction in foreign borrow ing [see Grabel, 
2003a, and references therein].  
To the extent that borrow ers assume at least some foreign loan obligations, it is imperative 
that the allocation and terms of these loans be managed by the Government. Careful management 
of the allocation of foreign debt can ensure that it is used for productive, developmental purposes. 
Prior to financial liberalization in the 1990s, many governments in East and Southeast Asia tightly 
coordinated allocation and access to foreign loans.  
U ntil quite recently, policymakers in China and India maintained tight restrictions on foreign 
borrow ing through a variety of means [for details, see Epstein et al., 2004]. For example, Chinese 
domestic firms w ere required to obtain government approval for any foreign loans undertaken. 
The Indian Government maintained firm restrictions over the level and terms of the external debts 
held by domestic firms. Responding to the lessons of the 1997 Asian crisis, India restricted 
commercial borrow ing in foreign currencies. The Ministry of Finance still maintains annual ceilings 
on the size and interest rate on loans sought by domestic firms. The Ministry also rules on requests 
for foreign loans on a case-by-case basis, basing its determinations on the maturity structure and 
end-use of the proposed loans. In the approval process, priority is given to longer-term loans and 
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loans for priority sectors. Firms in China and India have low  levels of external indebtedness and 
external financial fragility precisely because of government policies tow ards external debt.  
In general, policymakers should implement measures that restrict or otherw ise discourage 
domestic borrow ers from using financing strategies that involve locational and maturity mismatch. 
In addition to the ceilings, surcharges or approval processes discussed above, policymakers can 
design trip w ires and speed bumps that keep the levels of maturity and/or locational mismatch 
below  the critical thresholds. A trip w ire for locational mismatch is the ratio of foreign-currency 
denominated debt to domestic-currency denominated debt (w ith short-term obligations receiving 
a greater w eight in the calculation). A trip w ire for maturity mismatch is the ratio of short-term debt 
to long-term debt (w ith foreign-currency-denominated obligations receiving a greater w eight in 
the calculation). A graduated series of speed bumps that require borrow ers to reduce their extent 
of locational or maturity mismatch w ould be implemented w henever trip w ires revealed the early 
emergence of these vulnerabilities.  
In those cases w here foreign loans have been significant, economic reforms that promote 
grow th can replace the resources initially lost if there is a reduction in foreign borrow ing due to  
the measures described above. Governments and central banks that take steps to restrict foreign 
borrow ing can replace at least some of the finance that is foregone by implementing measures that 
increase their ability to mobilize and channel domestic saving to projects that are central to a pro-
poor grow th agenda. In this connection, measures that restrict the exit options of domestic savers 
and businesses w ould increase the pool of capital available domestically (since much of it is 
presently lost to capital flight, see section 6.2 of this module).  
The coordination of industrial policy and domestic financial regulation can also ensure that 
domestic firms have access to capital that is generated domestically. Tax reform is yet another 
means of increasing the domestic resource base. More generally, a multi-faceted pro-poor grow th 
agenda w ill generate higher levels of investment and economic grow th over time. If this approach 
is successful, the economy in the medium- to long-term w ill generate new  domestic resources that 
can be used to finance additional investment.  
6.2  PO LICIES TO W ARD  PO RTFO LIO  IN VESTMEN T 
Management of portfolio investment (PI) w arrants serious consideration. Various types of 
management techniques have contributed importantly to economic development in a range of 
countries. Careful management of PI can maximize the benefits and minimize the costs associated 
w ith this resource. Many countries have successfully regulated PI for extended periods of time. For 
instance, during the tw o decades that follow ed W orld W ar II, all industrialized countries heavily 
regulated PI inflow s and outflow s [H elleiner, 1994]. The only exception w as the U SA, but even it 
resorted to temporary management of PI for a short time in the 1960s w hen policymakers sought 
to enhance confidence in the country’s faltering economy. Indeed, most Continental European 
countries and Japan maintained stringent management of portfolio and other capital flow s until 
the mid-1980s.  
The use of capital management techniques w as not confined to w ealthy countries. 
Management of PI w as the norm in developing countries until orthodoxy in economic policy 
attained prominence. By any reasonable account, management of portfolio and other capital flow s 
contributed importantly to the success of numerous developing countries during the era of their 
strongest economic performance, namely, the period betw een the 1950s and the mid-1970s. 
Compared to the orthodox era, developing countries as a w hole w itnessed impressive economic 
performance during the three decades that follow ed W orld W ar II, a time w hen capital 
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management techniques w ere used w idely. Management of capital movements (in addition to 
industrial and trade policy) contributed significantly to the strong economic performance of many 
East and Southeast Asian countries during the 1970s and 1980s.  
Some developing countries continue to use (or have recently used) techniques to manage PI 
in the service of important objectives. And even in the current climate, a few  large developing 
countries—some until quite recently—have effectively utilized techniques to manage PI inflow s 
and outflow s. H ere, w e identify recent examples of such strategies.  
Malaysian authorities tw ice imposed restrictions over PI during the 1990s. The first such effort 
w as in early 1994. At that time, the Malaysian economy received dramatic increases in the volume 
of private capital inflow s (including, but not limited to, PI). Policymakers w ere concerned that these 
inflow s w ere feeding an unsustainable speculative boom in real estate and stock prices and w ere 
creating pressures on the domestic currency. In this context, policymakers implemented stringent, 
temporary inflow -capital management policies. These measures included restrictions on the 
maintenance of domestic currency-denominated deposits and borrow ing by foreign banks, 
management of the foreign exchange exposure of domestic banks and large firms, and 
prohibitions on the sale to foreigners of domestic money market securities w ith a maturity of less 
than one year.  
Reaction to these measures w as rapid and dramatic, so much so that authorities w ere able to 
dismantle them as planned in under a year (since they achieved their goals during this time). 
D uring the period that the capital management techniques w ere in place, the volume of net 
private capital inflow s and short-term inflow s fell sharply, the composition of these flow s w as 
altered significantly, pressure on the currency w as reduced, and the inflation of stock and real 
estate prices w as curtailed [Palma, 2000]. The immediate, pow erful reaction to these temporary 
capital management policies underscores the potential of speed bumps to stem such incipient 
difficulties successfully.  
The Malaysian government again implemented stringent management of capital inflow s and 
outflow s in 1998 during the East Asian financial crisis. This effort involved restrictions on foreign 
access to the domestic currency, on international transfer and trading of the currency, and on the 
convertibility of currency held outside of the country. The Government also established a fixed 
value for the domestic currency, closed the secondary market in equities, and prohibited non-
residents from selling local equities held for less than one year.  
By numerous accounts, these stringent measures prevented the further financial implosion of 
the country—a notable achievement since the country w as also gripped by a severe political and 
social crisis during this time. Comparing the situation of Malaysia to other countries that w ere 
affected by the Asian crisis, studies find that the country’s capital management techniques w ere 
responsible for the faster recovery of its economy and stock market as w ell as the smaller 
reductions in employment and w ages [Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001]. The latter achievements w ere 
possible because capital management techniques provided the Government w ith the ability to 
implement reflationary economic and social policies uninhibited by the threat of additional capital 
flight or IMF disapproval.  
From 1992 to 1998, policymakers in Chile and Colombia regulated PI extensively and 
successfully. D uring that time, the Colombian Government did not allow  foreign investors to 
purchase debt instruments or corporate equity. This policy w as designed to prevent the possibility 
that financial instability could be induced by the sudden exit of foreign investors from liquid 
investment holdings. H ow ever, there w ere no significant capital management techniques that 
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focused on FD I. The differential treatment of FD I and PI w as intended to promote the type of 
foreign investment that the Government deemed important to economic grow th, w hile protecting 
the economy from destabilizing forms of investment.  
The Chilean Government had similar motivations for its policy tow ard foreign investment in 
the country. By using the reserve requirement tax of 30 per cent on foreign investment, the 
government sought to lengthen the time horizon of investment and encourage more stable forms 
of foreign investment. FD I and PI faced a one-year residence requirement. The Government also 
prevented pension fund managers from investing more than 12 per cent of their assets abroad. 
This policy w as intended to curb the possibility of capital flight by the most important type of large 
domestic investor.  
N umerous empirical studies conclude that capital management techniques in Chile and 
Colombia played a constructive role in changing the composition and maturity structure (though not 
the volume) of net capital inflow s, particularly after capital management techniques w ere 
strengthened in 1994-95 [see Grabel, 2003c, and references therein]. Follow ing implementation of 
these policies in both countries, external financing in general moved from debt to FD I. Policymakers 
in both Chile and Colombia w ere able to implement grow th-oriented policies because the risk of 
foreign investor flight w as significantly curtailed by their capital management techniques.  
Finally, the macroeconomic stability fostered by these management techniques contributed 
to the financial stability experienced by Chile and Colombia follow ing the Mexican and the Asian 
financial crises. For instance, w hile other countries in Latin America w ere devastated by these 
events (due to the exit of investors from equity and government bond markets), Chile remained 
largely stable and only began to experience a significant reduction in private capital inflow s in 
August 1998.  
In the case of China, up until the gradual move to liberalize international financial flow s that 
began a few  years ago, the participation of foreigners in equity markets w as limited very strictly, 
and the activities of its largely state-ow ned banks w ere circumscribed (e.g., lending to foreigners 
for certain kinds of projects w as tightly regulated and access to foreign currency severely 
restricted). Chinese residents also faced obstacles to capital expatriation. In fact, the Chinese 
Government tightened restrictions and introduced new  techniques to manage finance follow ing 
the Asian crisis.  
As the crisis unfolded, the Chinese Government announced new  restrictions on foreign 
exchange transactions involving more than U S$ 100,000, introduced new  measures making it more 
difficult for domestic and international companies to move money into and out of the country, and 
introduced strict new  penalties on Chinese companies that maintained illegal foreign currency 
deposits overseas. Similarly, during the Asian financial crisis, authorities in Taiw an PO C also took 
steps to prevent illegal trading of funds managed by George Soros (because these funds w ere 
blamed for causing the local stock market to fall).  
There is a strong case for restricting the access of domestic savers to foreign capital markets. 
The flight of domestic investors can induce financial instability, as w ell as reduce the tax base and 
the pool of domestic savings available for allocation by domestic financial institutions. For these 
reasons, there is a strong case for restricting the ability of domestic investors to hold foreign 
savings accounts and engage in capital flight.  
In the mid-1980s, despite being the fourth largest foreign debtor in the w orld, the Republic  
of Korea w as saved from a debt crisis partly because of stringent management of capital outflow s. 
China and India provide more recent examples. China maintained firm restrictions on the ability  
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of domestic investors to engage in foreign PI until a few  years ago (by limiting their access to 
foreign currencies in the first place). India, too, has been gradually loosening its traditionally firm 
management of international financial flow s over the last few  years. Prior to liberalization, the exit 
options of domestic investors w ere tightly restricted via limitations on their access to foreign 
currency. Indian residents and firms w ere simply precluded from maintaining foreign currency 
accounts abroad, w hile Indian banks could not accept deposits or extend loans in foreign 
currencies. Recent studies have show n that the combined effects of restrictions on capital flight, 
currency speculation and access to foreign currency and loans protected China and India from 
instability during the Asian financial crisis.  
The above discussion suggests that there are several directions for managing portfolio 
investment (PI). The success of blunt restrictions on PI in China, India, Chile and Colombia suggest 
that foreign investors do not necessarily shun countries w ith minimum-stay requirements on 
foreign investment or other types of capital management techniques. W e have also seen that the 
tax system can be used to influence the composition and/or maturity structure of international 
capital flow s. The potential for flight by domestic investors and savers can be reduced via 
implementation of exit taxes, prohibitions on flight or restrictions on access to foreign currencies. 
Finally, the Malaysian experience suggests that speed-bump style management of PI can be 
effective as w ell.  
The trip w ire-speed bump approach lends itself to the design of temporary management of PI. 
A trip w ire that w ould reveal the vulnerability to the risk of PI flight is the ratio of total accumulated 
foreign PI to gross equity market capitalization or gross domestic capital formation. If the trip w ire 
revealed that a country w ere particularly vulnerable to the reversal of PI inflow s, a graduated series 
of speed bumps w ould slow  the entrance of new  inflow s until the ratio fell either because domestic 
capital formation or gross equity market capitalization increased sufficiently or because foreign PI 
fell. Thus, a speed bump on PI w ould slow  unsustainable financing patterns until a larger 
proportion of any increase in investment could be financed domestically. W e emphasize the 
importance of speed bumps governing inflow s of PI because they exert their effects at times w hen 
the economy is attractive to foreign investors; thus, they are not as likely to trigger investor panic as 
are outflow  restrictions. Although not a substitute for outflow  management, inflow  restrictions also 
reduce the frequency, as w ell as the magnitude, w ith w hich the former must be used.  
6.3  PO LICIES TO W ARD  FD I 
Because Foreign D irect Investment (FD I) is a type of financial flow , it is highly relevant to a module 
on financial policy. At the same time, FD I can also be more than a financial flow : it can arrive along 
w ith a package of technology, access to international markets, and expertise in sales and 
production. FD I can come in tw o general forms: as a so-called ‘Greenfield’ investment, w here new  
plant and equipment are associated w ith FD I; or it can arrive as part of a merger and acquisition 
(M&A), w here a foreign investor buys more than 10 per cent of the equity of a domestic firm  
(a so-called ‘Brow nfield’ investment).  
FD I is seen as a highly desirable form of international investment by many developing 
countries because governments often see it as: 1) more stable than other flow s, 2) as a mechanism 
for bringing a great deal of net capital into the country, 3) as a vehicle for bringing new  technology 
and expertise and 4) as a means for promoting integration w ith international markets. 
In view  of these perceived benefits, many developing countries are w illing to make significant 
(and often costly) adjustments to domestic economic policy and institutions in order to attract FD I 
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inflow s. A key question is w hether the benefits of FD I inflow s offset the costs associated w ith the 
policy and institutional changes that are often undertaken to attract them.  
An extensive literature has assessed the impacts of FD I on developing countries. Most of it 
finds that the positive impacts are, in general, smaller than many developing country governments 
believe (H anson, 2001; U N CTAD , 2000). In most cases, there are modest degrees of technology and 
skill transfer; limited degrees of employment generation; limited net inflow s of capital due to 
domestic sourcing of funds and profit remittances; and limited linkages to the domestic economy 
(this is reflected in modest increases in value added in production). Some evidence also suggests 
that FD I flow s are not significantly more stable than portfolio flow s. Finally, as discussed in section 
2.3, most countries, no matter how  hard they try, can attract only very limited amounts of FD I, 
especially since most of it flow s to a relatively small number of developing countries. 
Still, under the right circumstances and w ith the appropriate institutional structures, FD I 
inflow s can contribute to development. An examination of historical experiences suggests the w ays 
in w hich FD I as a financial inflow  can be managed in a development friendly manner. (See Box 6). 
BO X 6 
A  D evelopm ental A pproach to FD I 
Some countries, especially in East Asia, offer particularly good recent examples of strategies for maximizing the 
developmental benefits of FD I. Even more recently, China, India and Vietnam have adopted highly strategic 
attitudes tow ard FD I (rather than the ‘open door’ policy in place in so many countries). The experience of this 
latter group of countries demonstrates that foreign investors w ill not necessarily shun countries that apply capital 
management techniques to FD I. Indeed, evidence also show s that w hen deciding w here to channel their 
resources, foreign investors place more emphasis on a large domestic market, an educated w orkforce, rising 
incomes, economic grow th and sound infrastructure than on a liberal regulatory regime. Thus, policymakers in 
developing countries have no reason to think that low  w ages and lax regulation are appropriate strategies for 
attracting FD I.  
FD I policy stands the best chance of contributing to pro-poor grow th objectives if policymakers develop a 
clear vision as to how  it contributes to the country’s overall macroeconomic aims. Countries such as Republic of 
Korea and Taiw an PO C are know n to have used strict regulation on FD I in most industries, w hile also taking a very 
liberal attitude tow ards FD I in others. This mixture of restrictive and liberal policies w as possible because the 
Governments developed a clear FD I strategy that differentiated industries. The recent experiences of Singapore 
and Costa Rica show  that policymakers can target the attraction of particular types of FD I (or even target particular 
firms) as a central part of their overall economic strategy. For example, the potential of different types of FD I might 
be gauged according to their employment multiplier. 
 
The precise strategy tow ard FD I taken in any particular country should depend on the nature 
of the FD I that is being sought, the country’s endow ments, and the grow th and poverty-reduction 
objectives of the Government. Some countries, especially the poorest ones, may have narrow  goals 
for FD I, seeking only an infusion of foreign capital that w ill increase employment (under any terms), 
reduce poverty and attract foreign exchange. The industries for garments, shoes and toys often 
function in this limited, but in some cases, economically important capacity.  
In such cases, it may be acceptable—or even important—that the country remain open to  
FD I because the industries are seen strictly as a strategic means to attract foreign capital in the 
short run. Many countries have established export processing zones for the purpose of attracting 
FD I to these types of industries. H ow ever, it should be noted that the types of industries that tend 
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to populate export-processing zones are often developmental dead ends in the long run. 
Therefore, policymakers need to devise a strategy to reinvest the export earnings generated  
by such industries in order to generate new  industrial capabilities. 
In some countries and in some industries, the Government may find it necessary to induce 
foreign investors to undertake expensive investments in capital equipment and technology. These 
types of foreign investments can sometimes be a precondition for using the country’s natural 
resources to some advantage because the technology or finance necessary to exploit or extract 
natural (e.g., mineral) resources is not alw ays available domestically. In this context, it may be 
necessary to adopt an FD I strategy for a sector that is attractive to foreign investors, but allow s  
the host country to extract the largest possible ‘rent’ from their ow n natural resources. Carefully 
structured joint-operating agreements have w orked w ell in some countries.  
In some cases, the Government may seek to promote certain industries as part of an industrial 
policy aimed at creating long-run international competitiveness in some realm. At the early stages, 
this might necessitate a major injection of new  technology and capital, a circumstance that 
necessitates the participation of foreign firms. In this type of situation, it is important for the 
national government to negotiate w ith foreign firms over technology transfer and prevent these 
firms from imposing restrictions on exports and R&D . These matters w ere w ell negotiated in the 
cases of the Chinese auto industry and the Korean fast train project in the mid-1990s. 
Finally, in those cases in w hich the country is reasonably close to achieving international 
competitiveness in a particular industry, it may be necessary to exclude foreign firms altogether. 
This is especially important w here the domestic market is small. This restriction may be necessary 
so that local firms have the greatest possible opportunity to develop their competitive advantage.  
The main point is that there is no single appropriate strategy for all types of FD I and for all 
types of countries. Policies tow ards FD I must be tailored to the particular conditions of each 
industry and each country. And, as w ith other types of capital flow s, management of FD I must be 
dynamic so that policy evolves as internal and external conditions change.  
6.4  PO LICIES TO W ARD  PRIVATE REMITTAN CES 
Researchers have only recently begun to examine the contribution of remittances to economic 
grow th, investment, household consumption and poverty reduction. Indeed, Solimano [2003] is 
one of the only studies that address these macroeconomic issues in a preliminary fashion. Rempell 
[2005] considers these issues in the Mexican context. At this point, there is a great deal more 
empirical w ork to be done, particularly w ith regard to how  recipients use these funds (i.e., w hether 
they smooth consumption or promote investment) and w hether they substitute for or complement 
savings by recipients. 
There is reason to consider mechanisms that reduce the cost of sending and receiving 
remittances in order to increase the size of the potential remittance pool. It is also important to 
increase the ability of the domestic banking system in recipient countries to mobilize these funds in 
accordance w ith a pro-poor grow th agenda. Some of the initiatives discussed in section 4.2 may be 
useful in the latter connection.  
Solimano [2003] argues that on the sending-country side, banks should be encouraged to 
develop new  low -cost product lines for migrants, such as special checking, savings or ATM 
accounts. O n the recipient country side, he suggests several strategies. For example, 
governments and local financial institutions can issue interest-bearing bonds for emigrants as a 
vehicle for channelling remittances; housing and education accounts can be created to channel 
48 Training Module N o. 3 – Financial Policy 
 
 
remittances to these activities in the home country; and alliances can be created betw een 
domestic banks in the receiving countries and banks in the sending countries w ith the goal  
of reducing the costs of remittances.  
Rempell’s [2005] w ork on remittances to Mexico has relevance beyond the country. H e 
proposes the creation of opportunities for migrant w orkers to remit their earnings into foreign 
currency accounts in domestic banks. H e acknow ledges that this measure alone might not reduce 
the cost of remittances in rural areas since large banks rarely have a presence outside of the cities. 
For that reason, he suggests that microfinance institutions should become eligible to receive 
international transfers. H e also describes an innovative program in the Mexican state of Zacateca 
that is designed to leverage the developmental potential of remittances. Beginning in 1992, the 
local government began to match (initially at a tw o-for-one, and now  at a three-for-one, rate) 
monies that w ere sent to the state by ‘home tow n associations’ of migrants living in the U .S.A..  
6.5  A BRIEF D ISCUSSIO N  O F TH E CO MPLEMEN TARITY BETW EEN  TH E MANAGEMEN T  
O F EXCHANGE RATES AN D  IN TERNATIO NAL CAPITAL FLO W S 
As noted in the introduction to this section, a discussion of strategies tow ard the exchange rate is 
outside the scope of this module.19 There may be good reasons (indeed, very good reasons) for 
countries to pursue diverse types of managed exchange rate regimes, such as craw ling or 
adjustable currency pegs. These approaches have played important roles in promoting 
industrialization, export and employment grow th and financial stability in many countries in the 
post-W W II period and in the recent era [see discussion in Chang and Grabel, 2004, ch. 11; 
W illiamson, 2002].  
For the purposes of this module, w e simply note that managed exchange rate regimes of any 
type are sustainable only if supported by techniques to manage international capital flow s. This is 
because high volumes of international capital inflow s or outflow s make it difficult for authorities to 
maintain any type of currency peg w ithin a pre-determined range. Absent the ability to maintain 
the exchange rate w ithin a pre-determined range, the best laid plans to promote export, 
employment and/or pro-poor grow th and macroeconomic stability w ill be compromised. 
Moreover, authorities w ill need to maintain extremely large holdings of foreign exchange reserves 
in order to protect the currency from a speculative attack—a circumstance that carries w ith it large 
opportunity costs.  
7  CO N CLU SIO N S 
W e have argued that the financial landscape in developing countries faces serious challenges 
involving excessively high real interest rates, low  levels of credit creation, and a dearth of long-
term, ‘patient’ capital and capital for small- and medium-sized enterprises and poor households. 
The global financial landscape is also inadequate to the task of promoting pro-poor grow th in the 
developing w orld. Globally, financial markets are characterized by a misallocation of savings and by 
the pro-cyclical nature of credit and capital flow s.  
W e have also argued that the policies of financial liberalization that have been pursued in 
many developing countries over the last quarter century have exacerbated the challenges facing 
them. In particular, financial liberalization has often led to greater inequality and to a stagnation  
of incomes and employment opportunities for the poor.  
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The main contribution of this Training Module on Financial Policy has not been to demonstrate 
the inadequacy of the developing-country or the global financial landscape. Rather, the chief 
contribution of this w ork has been to demonstrate that there exists a w ide range of strategies that 
financial policymakers in developing countries can use to promote pro-poor grow th. O f course, 
financial polices alone are not a panacea for the poverty that plagues the developing w orld. 
Moreover, the challenges associated w ith significant financial reform cannot be ignored. H ow ever, 
it is imperative that w e recognize that properly formulated and nationally specific financial policies 
can play an important role in providing finance for employment and in building assets by the poor, 
can help stabilize the macro-economy, and can enhance the economic and social pow er of the 
poor in the developing w orld.  
W e have argued that the financial sector has numerous important roles to play in promoting 
pro-poor grow th. It can:  
• Mobilize savings that can be used for productive investment and employment 
generation; 
• Create credit for employment generation and poverty reduction at modest and stable 
real interest rates; 
• Allocate credit for employment generation and help the poor to build assets, including 
in agriculture, small- and medium-sized enterprises and housing; 
• Provide patient (long-term) credit for productivity-enhancing innovation and 
investment; 
• Provide financing for public investment to promote employment generation and 
productivity enhancement;  
• H elp allocate risks to those w ho can most easily and efficiently bear them; 
• H elp stabilize the economy by reducing vulnerability to financial crises and pro-cyclical 
movements in finance, and by helping maintain moderate rates of inflation; 
• H elp the poor by providing basic financial and banking services. 
 
W e have show n that there exist diverse types of financial policies and institutions that can play 
a useful role in promoting pro-poor grow th in developing countries. In this module, w e have 
described a large number of principles, policies and institutions—from earlier historical eras and 
from the current period that can and have promoted pro poor grow th.  W e have also described a 
number of more innovative policies that w e believe w arrant consideration by today’s policymakers. 
W e have found that pro-poor financial policies have tended to be the most successful w hen 
they satisfied several conditions: 
• They have had strong monitoring mechanisms in place to increase the likelihood that 
they could achieve their goals. 
• They have operated in a context of robust aggregate demand so that there has been a 
facilitating environment for economic grow th. 
• They have also operated in a domestic and international environment in w hich there 
has not been a large degree of instability. 
• They have been part of a coherent overall developmental plan implemented by  
the government.  
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The main policy lessons of this Training Module are that: 1) countries should not become 
excessively reliant on private foreign capital to fund their development since such capital can be 
unstable and unreliable; 2) market allocation of finance needs to be embedded in strong financial 
regulations often supplemented by an important role for government guidance of finance to 
important sectors; 3) there is a large variety of successful w ays to use the financial system to 
mobilize and direct finance that make a judicious use of market incentives, government guarantees 
and monitoring to ensure that the finance goes to socially productive purposes 4) central banks, 
along w ith other public financial institutions, need to be involved in promoting a developmental 
role for finance; and 5) capital management techniques, usually of a dynamic and flexible nature, 
can be a very important tool for reducing the negative aspects of global financial integration w hile 
enhancing the positive aspects.  
The overriding message of this module is that there exists a w ide range of financial policies 
and experiences that policymakers can draw  upon and adapt in accordance w ith their national  
pro-poor grow th objectives.  
International Poverty Centre 51 
 
 
REFEREN CES 
Aizenman, J.B. Pinto and A. Radziw ill (2004). "Sources for Financing D omestic Capital: Is Foreign 
Saving a Viable O ption for D eveloping Countries?" N BER W orking Paper N o. 10624. 
Amoako-Tuffour, J. (2002). “Forging Linkages betw een Formal and Informal Financial Sectors: 
Emerging Practices in Ghana,” African Finance Journal, 4 (1), pp. 1–31. 
Amsden, Alice (2001). The Rise of ‘the Rest’: Challenges to the W est from  Late-Industrializing 
Econom ies. N ew  York: O xford U niversity Press. 
Ang, James B. and W arw ick J. McKibbin (2005). "Financial Liberalization, Financial Sector 
D evelopment and Grow th: Evidence from Malaysia," Brookings D iscussion Papers in  
International Economics. 
Arestis, P. and P. D emetriades (1997). “Financial D evelopment and Economic Grow th: Assessing  
the Evidence,” Econom ic Journal, pp. 783-799. 
Aryeetey, E. (2003). “Recent D evelopments in African Financial Markets: Agenda for Further 
Research,” Journal of African Econom ies , 12 (AERC Supplement 2), pp. 111-152. 
_______. (1998). “Informal Finance for Private Sector D evelopment in Africa,” Background paper 
prepared for the African D evelopment Report 1998. 
Asian D evelopment Bank (AD B) (2000). The Role of Central Banks in M icrofinance in Asia and the 
Pacific, Vols. 1 &  2. Manila: Asian D evelopment Bank. 
Baldacci, E., L. de Mello and G. Inchauste (2002). “Financial Crisis, Poverty and Income D istribution,” 
Paper presented at the IMF Conference on Macroeconomic Policies and Poverty Reduction, 
W ashington, D C, March 14-15.  
Berger, A., N ., M. Miller, R. Petersen, R. Raajan and J. Stein (2001). “D oes Function Follow  
O rganizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks,”  
N BER Paper, D ecember. 
Bhattacharyya, P.C. (1971). Central Banking in a Developing Econom y. Bombay, India:  
Vora &  Co. Publishers, PVT. LTD . 
Biggs, T, S. (1991). “H eterogeneous Firms and Efficient Financial Intermediation in Taiw an,” in  
M. Roemer and C. Jones (eds.), M arkets in Developing Countries: Parallel, Fragm ented, and Black, San 
Francisco: International Center for Economic Grow th, pp. 167–197. 
Bloomfield, Arthur I. (1957). “Some Problems of Central Banking in U nderdeveloped Countries,”  
The Journal of Finance, 12(2), May, pp. 190-204. 
Boyce, James K. and Léonce N dikumana (2001). “Is Africa a N et Creditor? N ew  Estimates of Capital 
Flight from Severely Indebted Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1970-1996,” Journal of Developm ent 
Studies, 38(2), pp. 27-56. 
Braunstein, Elissa and James H eintz (2006). “Gender Bias and Central Bank Policy: Employment and 
Inflation Reduction,” PERI W orking Paper <w w w .peri.umass.edu>. 
Brimmer, Andrew  F. (1971). “Central Banking and Economic D evelopment: The Record of 
Innovation,” Journal of M oney, Credit and Banking, 3(4), N ovember, pp. 780-792. 
Bruno, Michael and W illiam Easterly (1998). "Inflation Crises and Long-Run Grow th," Journal of 
M onetary Econom ics, 41, pp. 3-26. 
52 Training Module N o. 3 – Financial Policy 
 
 
Burkett, P. and A. K. D utt (1991). "Interest Rate Policy, Effective D emand, and Grow th in LD Cs," 
International Review  of Applied Econom ics, 5(2), pp. 127-153. 
Chang, H .-J. (1994). The Political Econom y of Industrial Policy, London and Basingstoke:  
Macmillan Press. 
_______. (1998). “Korea: The Misunderstood Crisis,” W orld Developm ent, 26(8), pp. 1555-1561.  
Chang, H -J and I. Grabel (2004). Reclaim ing Developm ent: An Alternative Econom ic Policy M anual, 
London: Zed Books. 
Chin, Kok Fay and Kristin N ordhaug (2002). "W hy Are There D ifferences in the Resilience of Malaysia 
and Taiw an to Financial Crisis?" European Journal of Developm ent Research, 14(1), pp. 77-100. 
Christensen, G. (1993). "The Limits to Informal Financial Intermediation," W orld Developm ent,  
2(5), pp. 721-731.  
Cornia, Giovanni Andrea (2003). “Globalization and the D istribution of Income betw een and w ithin 
Countries,” in H a-Joon Chang (ed.) Rethinking Developm ent Econom ics, London: Anthem Press, 
pp.325-345. 
Crotty, James and Kang-kook Lee (2004). “From East Asian Miracle to N eoliberal Mediocrity: The 
Effects of Liberalization and Financial O pening on the Post-crisis Korean Economy,” unpublished 
paper, U niversity of Massachusetts, Political Economy Research Institute. 
D aley-H arris, Michael (2005). “State of the Microcredit Campaign Summit Report,” W ashington, D . C: 
Microcredit Summit Campaign,  
_______. (2002). Pathw ays O ut of Poverty, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. 
D emirgüc-Kunt, A. and E. D etragiache (1998). “Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility,” 
International Monetary Fund W orking Paper N o. 83. 
_______. (1999). “Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility,” in B. Pleskovic and J. Stiglitz (eds.), 
Annual W orld Bank Conference on Developm ent Econom ics 1998, W ashington, D . C: W orld Bank,  
pp. 303-331.  
Eichengreen, Barry (2001). “Capital Account Liberalization: W hat D o Cross-country Studies Tell U s?” 
W orld Bank Econom ic Review  15(3), pp. 341-365. 
Eichengreen, B., A. Rose and C. W yplosz (1996). “Exchange Rate Mayhem: The Antecedents and 
Aftermath of Speculative Attacks,” Econom ic Policy, 21(21), pp. 249-312. 
Epstein, Gerald (2000). "Myth, Mendacity and Mischief in the Theory and Practice of Central 
Banking," PERI, mimeo. 
Epstein, Gerald (2002). "Alternatives to Inflation Targeting", PERI, mimeo. <w w w .umass.edu/peri>. 
Epstein, Gerald, ed. (2005). Financialization and the W orld Econom y, N orthampton, MA:  
Edw ard Elgar. 
Epstein, Gerald, ed. (2005). Capital Flight and Capital Controls in Developing Countries. N orthampton, 
MA: Edw ard Elgar. 
Epstein, Gerald, (2006). "Central Banks as Agents of Economic D evelopment," U N U -W ider and PERI 
<w w w .umass.edu/peri>.  
International Poverty Centre 53 
 
 
Epstein, Gerald and James H eintz (2006). “Monetary Policy and Financial Sector Reform for 
Employment Creation and Poverty Reduction in Ghana,” Political Economy Research Institute 
(PERI), U niversity of Massachusetts-Amherst, PERI W orking Paper N o. 113, March. 
Epstein, Gerald, I. Grabel and K. S. Jomo (2004). “Capital Management Techniques in D eveloping 
Countries: An Assessment of Experiences from the 1990s and Lessons for the Future,” Paper 
prepared for the XVIth Technical Group Meeting of the Group of Tw enty-four, Port of Spain, 
Trinidad and Tobago, February 13–14. Published as G-24 Discussion Paper No. 27, March 2004, 
U nited N ations, N Y and Geneva.  
Frankenberg, E., J. P. Smith and D . Thomas (2002). “Economic Shocks, W ealth and W elfare,”  
Paper presented at the IMF Conference on Macroeconomic Policies and Poverty Reduction, 
W ashington, D . C, March 14-15. 
Fry, Maxw ell J. (1995). M oney, Interest and Banking in Econom ic Developm ent. 2nd Edition. 
Baltimore: Johns H opkins. 
Gallardo, J. (2001). “A Framew ork for Regulating MicroFinance Institutions: The Experiences in 
Ghana and the Philippines,” W orld Bank, Financial Sector D evelopment D epartment. 
Gerschenkron, Alexander (1962). Econom ic Backw ardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge: 
H arvard U niversity Press. 
Ghosh, Jayati and C.P. Chandrasekhar (2001). Crisis as Conquest: Learning From  East Asia,  
N ew  D elhi: O rient Longman Publishers. 
Ghosh, Jayati, (2002). “Independent or Irrelevant? N otes on the Political Economy of Central 
Banking in the Brave N ew  W orld,” D ecember. http://w w w .ideasnetw ork.org  
Grabel, I. (2004). “Trip W ires and Speed Bumps: Managing Financial Risks and Reducing the 
Potential for Financial Crises in D eveloping Economies,” prepared for the XVIIIth Technical Group 
Meeting of the G-24 in Geneva, Sw itzerland, March 8-9, 2004. Published as G-24 Discussion Paper  
No. 33, N ovember 2004, U nited N ations, Geneva. 
_______. (2002). “N eoliberal Finance and Crisis in the D eveloping W orld,” M onthly Review , 
Special issue on “The N ew  Face of Capitalism,” 53(11), April, pp. 34-46.  
_______. (2003a). “International Private Capital Flow s and D eveloping Countries,” in H .-J. Chang 
(ed.), Rethinking Developm ent Econom ics, London: Anthem Press, pp. 325-345.  
_______. (2003b). “Predicting Financial Crisis in D eveloping Economies: Astronomy or Astrology?” 
Eastern Econom ics Journal, 29 (2), pp. 245–260. 
_______. (2003b). “Ideology, Pow er and the Rise of Independent Monetary Institutions in Emerging 
Economies,” in Jonathan Kirshner (ed.), M onetary O rders: Am biguous Econom ics, Ubiquitous Politics, 
Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press, pp. 25-52. 
_______. (2003c). “Averting Crisis: Assessing Measures to Manage Financial Integration in Emerging 
Economies,” Cam bridge Journal of Econom ics, 27(3), pp. 317-336. 
_______. (1997). “Savings, Investment and Functional Efficiency: A Comparative Examination of 
N ational Financial Complexes,” in Pollin (ed.), The M acroeconom ics of Saving, Finance and 
Investm ent, Ann Arbor: U niversity of Michigan Press, pp. 251-298. 
_______. (1995). “Speculation-led Economic D evelopment: A Post-Keynesian Interpretation  
of Financial Liberalization in the Third W orld,” International Review  of Applied Econom ics,  
9(2), pp. 127-49.  
54 Training Module N o. 3 – Financial Policy 
 
 
Grosh, B. and G. Somolekae (1996). “Mighty O aks from Little Acorns: Can Microenterprise Serve 
as the Seedbed of Industrialization?” W orld Developm ent, 24(12), pp. 1879-1890. 
H anson, Gordon (2001). "Should Countries Promote Foreign D irect Investment?" U N CTAD  G-24 
D iscussion Paper, Series N o. 9. 
H arvey, D avid (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism , N ew  York and O xford: O xford U niversity Press. 
H eintz, James (2006). "Grow th, Employment and Poverty Reduction," D fID  and PERI, mimeo. 
H elleiner, E. (2003). “The Southern Side of Embedded Liberalism,” in Jonathan Kirshner (ed.), 
M onetary O rders: Am biguous Econom ics, Ubiquitous Politics, Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press, pp. 55-77. 
_______. (1994). States and Reem ergence of Global Finance, Ithaca, N Y: Cornell Press. 
International Monetary Fund (2005). "Monetary and Fiscal Policy D esign Issues in Low -Income 
Countries," Policy D evelopment and Review  D epartment and The Fiscal Affairs D epartment, 
W ashington, D .C.: IMF, August 8. 
Kaminsky, G. and C. Reinhart (1999). “The Tw in Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-
Payments Problems,” Am erican Econom ics Review , 89(3), pp. 473-500. 
Kaplan, E and D . Rodrik (2001). “D id the Malaysian Capital Controls W ork?’ in S. Edw ards and J. 
Frankel (eds.), Preventing Currency Crises in Em erging M arkets, Chicago: U niversity of Chicago Press, 
pp. 393-441. 
Kindleberger, Charles (1973). The W orld in Depression, 1929-1939, Berkeley, CA: The U niversity of 
California Press. 
Kotz, D avid (1997). Revolution from  Above, London: Routledge. 
Kuczynski, P.-P. and J. W illiamson (eds.) (2003). After the W ashington Consensus, W ashington, D . C: 
Institute for International Economics. 
Lapenu, Cécile (2002). “The Microfinance Revolution: Implications for the Role of the State,”  
in Manfred Zeller and Richard L. Meyer (eds.), The Triangle of M icrofinance, Baltimore, MD :  
Johns H opkins U niversity, pp. 297-320. 
Lee, Kang Kook and Arjun Jayadev (2006). "Capital Account Liberalization, Grow th and the Labor 
Share of Income: Review ing and Extending the Cross-Country Evidence," in Gerald Epstein (ed.), 
Capital Flight and Capital Controls in Developing Countries, N orthampton, MA: Edw ard Elgar 
Publishers. 
Lew is, P. and H . Stein (1997). “Shifting Fortunes: The Political Economy of Financial Liberalization  
in N igeria,” W orld Developm ent, 25(1), pp. 5-22. 
Li, Minqi (2004). “Aggregate D emand, Productivity, and ‘D isguised U nemployment’ in the Chinese 
Industrial Sector,” W orld Developm ent, 32(3), pp. 409-425. 
Marglin, Stephen and Juliet Schor (1990). The Golden Age of Capitalism : Reinterpreting the Postw ar 
Experience, N ew  York: O xford U niversity Press. 
Maxfield, Sylvia (1994). “Financial Incentives and Central Bank Authority in Industrializing N ations,” 
W orld Politics, 46(4), July, pp. 556-588. 
_______. (1997). Gatekeepers of Grow th: The International Political Econom y of Central Banking in 
Developing Countries, Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. 
International Poverty Centre 55 
 
 
McKinley, Terry (2006), "The Monopoly of Global Capital Flow s: W ho N eeds Structural Adjustment 
N ow ?" International Poverty Centre, W orking Paper #12. 
_______. (2005). “Economic Alternatives for Sub-Saharan Africa: ‘Poverty Traps’, MDG-Based 
Strategies and Accelerated Capital Accumulation,” Paper prepared for the G-24 Meeting,  
15-16 September 2005. 
McKinnon, Ronald I. (1973). M oney and Capital in Econom ic Developm ent, W ashington: Brookings 
Institution. 
Milanovic, Branko (2005). W orlds Apart: Global and International Inequality, 1950-2000, Princeton: 
Princeton U niversity Press.  
Mondi, Lumkile (2006). “Targeted Employment Programmes – The Case of the Industrial 
D evelopment Corporation,” South Africa: ID C, mimeo. 
N embhard, Jessica (1996). Capital Control, Financial Regulation, and Industrial Policy in South Korea 
and Brazil, W estport, Conn.: Praeger. 
N issanke, M. and E. Aryeetey (1998). Financial Integration and Developm ent: Liberalization  
and Reform  in Sub-Saharan Africa, Studies in Developm ent Econom ics, Vol. 11, London and  
N ew  York, Routledge. 
O campo, Jose Antonio (2003). "Capital Account and Counter-Cyclical Prudential Regulation in 
D eveloping Countries," in From  Capital Surges to Drought: Seeking Stability for Em erging Econom ies, 
ed. Ricardo Ffrench-D avis and Stephany Griffith-Jones, N ew  York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 217-244. 
Palma, G. (2000). “The Three Routes to Financial Crises: The N eed for Capital Controls,”  
CEPA W orking Paper Series III, N o. 18, N ew  School U niversity, N ew  York. 
Panitch, Leo and Sam Gidgin (2004). Global Capitalism  and Am erican Em pire, Merlin Press. 
Pickbourn, Lynda (2006). “Financing Micro-, Small- and Medium-scale Enterprises for D evelopment 
and Poverty Alleviation,” PERI, unpublished paper.  
Pollin, Robert (1995). “Financial Structures and Egalitarian Economic Policy,” New  Left Review ,  
214, pp. 26-61. 
Pollin, Robert, ed. (1997). The M acroeconom ics of Saving, Finance and Investm ent, Ann Arbor: 
U niversity of Michigan Press. 
Pollin, Robert, (1998). "Can D omestic Expansionary Policies Succeed in a Globally Integrated 
Environment? An Examination of Alternatives," in D ean Baker, Gerald Epstein and Robert Pollin 
(eds.), Globalization and Progressive Econom ic Policies, Cambridge: Cambridge U niversity Press,  
pp. 433-460. 
Pollin, Robert, Gerald Epstein, James H eintz and Leonce N dikumana (2006). An Em ploym ent 
Targeted Policy for South Africa, N orthampton, MA: PERI and Edw ard Elgar. 
Pollin, Robert and Andong Zhu (2006). "Inflation and Economic Grow th: A Cross Country  
N on-Linear Analysis," Journal of Post Keynesian Econom ics, 28, Summer. 
Prasad, E., K., S. Rogoff, J. W ei and M. Kose (2003). “Effects of Financial Globalization on D eveloping 
Countries: Some Empirical Evidence.” IMF. <http://w w w .imf.org/external/np/res/docs/2003/031703.htm>. 
Rahman, A. (1999). “Microcredit Initiatives for Equitable and Sustainable D evelopment: W ho Pays?” 
W orld Developm ent, 27(1), pp. 67-82.  
56 Training Module N o. 3 – Financial Policy 
 
 
Ravallion, M. (2002). “W ho is Protected? O n the Incidence of Fiscal Adjustment,” Paper presented  
at the IMF Conference on Macroeconomic Policies and Poverty Reduction, W ashington, D . C,  
March 14-15, 2002. 
Rempell, Larry, (2005). “Leveraging Migrant Remittances to Mexico: The Role for Sub-national 
Government,” Journal for Developm ent and Social Transform ation, pp. 69-78.  
Rodrik, D ani (1998), “W ho N eeds Capital-account Convertibility?” in P. Kenen (ed.), Should the IM F 
Pursue Capital-Account Convertibility? Princeton Essays in International Finance, N o. 207, pp. 55-65. 
_______. (2006). “The Social Cost of Foreign Exchange Reserves,” H arvard U niversity, mimeo. 
Saad Filho, Alfredo (2006). "Pro-Poor Monetary Policy: Tow ards a Macroeconomic Framew ork for 
Grow th and Poverty Reduction," Global Research Programme, International Poverty Centre, Brasilia. 
Saez, Law rence (2004). Banking Reform  in India and China, Basingstoke, England: 
Palgrave/MacMillan.  
Selvavinayagam, K. (1995). “Improving Rural Finance Markets for D eveloping Microenterprises,” 
FAO  Investment Centre, O ccasional Paper Series, N o. 2, June. 
Shaw , Edw ard (1973). Financial Deepening in Econom ic Developm ent, O xford:  
O xford U niversity Press. 
Singh, Ajit and Anne Zammit (2000). “International Capital Flow s: The Gender D imension,”  
W orld Developm ent, 28(7), pp. 1249-68. 
Solimano, Andrés (2003). “Remittances by Emigrants: Issues and Evidence,” W orld Institute  
for D evelopment Economics Research, U nited N ations U niversity, W orking Paper N o. 89. 
Stallings, Barbara and Rogerio Studart (2006). Finance for Developm ent, W ashington, D . C: Brookings 
Institution and U nited N ations, ECLAC. 
Stiglitz, Joseph, (1994). “The Role of the State in Financial Markets,” Proceedings of the W orld Bank 
Annual Conference on Developm ent Econom ics, 1993, W ashington, D . C: W orld Bank. 
Tang, S. Y. (1995). "Informal Credit Markets and Economic D evelopment in Taiw an,"  
W orld Developm ent, 23(5), pp. 845-55. 
Taylor, Lance (1991). Incom e Distribution, Inflation and Grow th: Lectures on Structuralist 
M acroeconom ic Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
U nited N ations Conference on Trade and D evelopment (U N CTAD ) (2000). Trade and Developm ent 
Report, Geneva: U N CTAD . 
Versluysen, E. (1999). Defying the O dds: Banking for the Poor, W est H artford, CT: Kumarian Press.  
W ade, R. (1990). Governing the M arket, Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. 
W eisbrot, M., D . Baker, E. Kraev and J. Chen (2001). “The Scorecard on Globalization  1980-2000,” 
Center for Economic Policy Research, September. 
<w w w .cepr.net/globalization/scorecard_on_globalization.htm>. 
W eller, C. (2001a). “Financial Crises after Financial Liberalisation: Exceptional Circumstances or 
Structural W eakness?’ Journal of Developm ent Studies, 38(1), pp. 98-127. 
_______. (2001b). “Multinational Banks in D eveloping and Transition Economies,” unpublished 
paper, March.  
International Poverty Centre 57 
 
 
W eller, C. and A. H ersh (2004). “The Long and Short of It: Global Liberalization, Poverty and 
Inequality,” Journal of Post Keynesian Econom ics, 26(3), pp. 471-504.  
W illiamson, J. (2002). Exchange Rate Regim es for Em erging M arkets: Reviving the Interm ediate O ption, 
W ashington, D C: Institute for International Economics. 
W illiamson, J. and M. Mahar (1998). “A Survey of Financial Liberalization,” Princeton Essays in 
International Finance, N ovember. 
W oo-Cumings, Meredith (ed.) (1999). The Developm ental State. Ithaca, N Y: Cornell U niversity Press. 
W orld Bank (2005). Global Developm ent Finance, W ashington, D . C: W orld Bank. 
Zeller, Manfred and Richard L. Meyer (eds.) (2002). The Triangle of M icrofinance, Baltimore, MD : 
Johns H opkins U niversity. 
Zhu, Andong, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin (2004). "Stock Market Liquidity and Economic Grow th: 
A Critical Appraisal of the Levine/Zervos Model," International Review  of Applied Econom ics,  
18(1), January. 
Zysman, John (1983). Governm ents, M arkets and Grow th, Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press. 
 
.
 N O TES 
 
1. The authors thank Terry McKinley, Acting D irector of the International Poverty Centre, for his helpful comments and for 
his support throughout the process of preparing this module. W e also thank Robert Pollin for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft, PERI colleagues James H eintz and Léonce N dikumana for sharing their expertise in many of the areas 
covered in this module, Maria Sperandei for superb research assistance, and Lynda Pickbourn both for superb research 
support and for important contributions to this module.  
2. The discussion in sections 2.1-2.3 draw s heavily on Chang and Grabel [2004, chs. 9-10]. Section 2.1 also draw s on Grabel 
[1995] and section 2.2 of Grabel [2003a].  
3. All data in this and the next paragraph from W orld Bank [2005]. 
4. This section draw s on McKinley [2006a]. 
5. The discussion in sections 4.2.-4.4 and 4.6 draw s heavily on Chang and Grabel [2004: ch. 10], except w here noted.  
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